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Resumo
Este artigo avalia a política de defesa e às questões 
de segurança de Taiwan e identifica as linhas de 
orientação deste domínio tendo em conta, por um 
lado, as necessidades de reestruturação interna 
das forças armadas; por outro, o conjunto dos de‑
safios tradicionais e emergentes no espaço da Ásia‑
Pacífico. Salienta‑se, desde logo, a mais central das 
preocupações, a relação inconstante com a China, 
dividida entre uma crescente cooperação do do‑
mínio socioeconómico e a perpetuação do conflito 
político‑militar. Acrescentam‑se novos factores con‑
junturais, desde ameaças como o terrorismo e os de‑
sastres ambientais, ao desenhar do puzzle geopolíti‑
co regional e à intensa diplomacia económica. Neste 
contexto, a análise centra‑se nas principais preocu‑
pações para o quadro da segurança de Taiwan. 
 
Abstract
Asia-Pacific New Strategic Environment and Tai-
wan Security Policy
This paper reviews Taiwan’s defense and security policy. 
On the one hand, it identifies its guidelines taking into 
consideration domestic needs for the armed forces reor-
ganization. On the other hand, it considers the tradi-
tional and emerging challenges in Asia-Pacific. One of 
the most central concerns is the inconstant relationship 
with China, divided between a growing socio-economic 
cooperation and the maintenance of a political-military 
conflict. The regional geopolitical puzzle and intense 
economic diplomacy faces new challenges such as te-
rrorism and environmental disasters. Within this con-
text, the analysis focuses on the most important issues 
concerning the Taiwanese security framework. 
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O conceito de segurança não é unívoco, ultrapassa em muito a simples concepção 
de “ameaça bélica”, podendo aparecer também associado à defesa dos interesses 
nacionais, à resistência e capacidade de sobrevivência de uma nação, território, povo 
ou individuo, à salvaguarda dos valores fundamentais, à defesa do ambiente, à paz 
e melhoria do bem‑estar, entre outros aspectos. Em causa estão, claramente, inter‑
pretações contraditórias sobre esta designação, de acordo com diferentes escolas de 
pensamento das relações internacionais. Assim, por exemplo, autores realistas como 
Hans Morgenthau, associam a noção de segurança à defesa do interesse nacional, 
justificando, igualmente, a política de defesa por este prisma. Segundo ele, “[O] con‑
ceito de interesse definido como poder impõe uma disciplina intelectual ao observa‑
dor e adiciona uma ordem racional no campo da política e, assim, tornando possível 
o entendimento teórico da política” (Morgenthau, 1993: 5). 1 
Noutro ângulo, pela via liberal, autores como Joseph Nye e Robert Keohane (2001) 
e David Mitrany (1966) ou David Mitrany, alargam a ideia para a denominada low 
politics e para as dimensões não militares como fatores capazes de moldar a política 
de segurança das nações. Segundo eles, a “interdependência” ou a “socialização”, 
por exemplo, são elementos importantes no apaziguamento das sociedades e das 
nações.  
Independentemente das perspetivas de enquadramento, a segurança e defesa da 
República da China (RC), vulgarmente conhecida por Taiwan2, abarca um conjun‑
to alargado de questões que acabam por encaixar em ambas as tendências teóricas. 
O objeto central deste artigo é precisamente apurar as linhas de orientação da polí‑
tica de segurança e defesa de Taiwan tendo em conta a evolução das suas relações 
com a RPC e o puzzle contraditório de cooperação e confrontação de poderes que 
marca o contexto da Ásia‑Pacífico. Reconhece‑se que, desde 2008, com o regresso 
do Partido Nacionalista do Kuomintang (KMT) ao poder3, sob a liderança de Ma 
Ying‑jeou, se tem verificado um clima de melhor entendimento, não deixando de 
1  No original: “The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, 
infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of 
politics possible” (Morgenthau, 1993: 5). 
2  Neste artigo, a República Popular da China, aparecerá aleatoriamente designada pelas siglas 
RPC ou por simplesmente por “China”, ao passo que a República da China, ora por RC ou por 
“Taiwan”. 
3  Entre 2000 e 2008, a RC foi governada pelo Partido Democrático Progressista (PDP), liderado 
por Chen Shui‑bian, cuja governação ficou marcada por uma postura mais desafiante à política 
de “uma só China”. 
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se salientar o princípio dos “três nãos”: não independência, não unificação, não ao 
uso da força. Desde então, Pequim e Taipé têm cooperado de forma crescente em 
muitos domínios da esfera económica, social e cultural, incluindo diálogos de alto 
nível, tal como o encontro entre o vice‑presidente taiwanês, Wu Den‑yih e líder 
do Partido Comunista Chinês (PCC) e futuro Primeiro‑Ministro, Li Keqiang, no 
Fórum Boao (Taipei Times, 2012: 1). 
Ainda assim, o conflito político mantém‑se intocável ou, pelo menos, estável, en‑
quanto persistem questões sobre a assimetria de forças entre os dois lados. Dando 
seguimento à análise, questionamos alguns aspectos que nos parecem adjacentes à 
temática central. Está a RC a abrandar a sua política de defesa face ao novo quadro 
de cooperação com a República Popular da China (RPC)? Aparece a RC alinhada 
com a RPC na defesa dos interesses de soberania “chineses” na região? São as 
confrontações de poder uma oportunidade para a ilha afirmar o seu papel de me‑
diador na região? 
O Ministério da Defesa de Taiwan (MDT) publica periodicamente o Relatório de 
Defesa Nacional (RDN), bianual, desde 1992, e a Revista de Defesa Quadrienal 
(RDQ), desde 2009. São os mais importantes documentos oficiais emitidos neste 
domínio e que permitem identificar as principais linhas de orientação, internas e 
externas, que moldam a sua política de defesa nacional. Desde logo, salienta‑se a 
mais soberana das problemáticas, a relação inconstante com a RPC, não só do pon‑
to de vista direto como indireto, na medida em que a diplomacia da ilha no espaço 
internacional está condicionada por este fator. 
A RPC não abdica da tentativa de recuperação do território para os seus domínios 
de soberania, admitindo uma solução “não pacífica”, mantendo Taiwan um esta‑
tuto de Estado não reconhecido – uma das mais intrincadas temáticas do direito 
internacional. Além disso, enquanto a região asiática passa por uma fase de intensa 
cooperação económica, a ilha tem dificuldade em participar de forma mais ativa 
neste processo. Acrescem ainda outras problemáticas, tais como a competição pela 
soberania de ilhas na região, um facto que pode arrastar Taiwan para uma con‑
frontação mais hostil com outros actores. A verdade é que tem estado a servir para 
os responsáveis políticos taiwaneses poderem afirmar o seu papel de mediador. 
Finalmente destacam‑se ainda outras questões não tradicionais como os desastres 
naturais, a pirataria marítima, ou o terrorismo como elementos preocupantes para 
a segurança da ilha. 
Na prossecução desta análise, em termos de arrumação das ideias, num primeiro 
momento, centramos o ponto de observação no novo ambiente estratégico da Ásia 
Oriental, no avivar das reclamações de soberania, nas confrontações de poder, in‑
cluindo a “viragem estratégica” dos EUA, as quais englobam o espaço geográfico 
circundante da ilha de Taiwan. De seguida analisamos a evolução das relações en‑
tre a China e Taiwan, delineando os pontos de convergência entre estes dois atores 
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e as principais linhas de orientação da política de segurança e defesa de Taiwan 
face aos contextos referenciados nos pontos iniciais. 
O Novo Ambiente Estratégico Regional 
Os mares da China Oriental e Meridional têm sido palco de uma relação parado‑
xal, por um lado, entre crescentes dinâmicas de cooperação económica e política; 
por outro, de fortes confrontações de poder, disputas de soberania e estado gene‑
ralizado de insegurança. Na verdade, esta é uma das matrizes caraterizadoras das 
relações entre actores da região da Ásia‑Pacífico, um sinal distintivo em corres‑
pondência com outros espaços de cooperação/integração económica, tal como a 
União Europeia. 
A ascensão económica da China e a sua vigorosa diplomacia na região têm sido 
um fator adicional na “agitação das águas”, que se faz sentir não só na afirmação 
económica como também pelo ascensão militar. Não admira que este gigante asiá‑
tico tenha despertado sentimentos antagónicos, divididos, simultaneamente, entre 
a oportunidade e a ameaça. Desde logo, pela via da oferta do gigantesco mercado 
chinês ao investimento e comércio externo para muitos investidores. A criação de 
uma área de comércio livre entre a ASEAN e a China (2002) veio intensificar ainda 
mais as trocas regionais, tendo‑se tornado a maior zona de comércio livre do mun‑
do e grande parte dos fluxos do comércio mundial.
Podemos ainda acrescentar outras dinâmicas regionais como a Cooperação Econó‑
mica da Grande Sub‑região do Mekong ou a Cooperação Económica Pan‑Golfo de 
Beidu (Chen, 2012: 52‑53). A verdade é que este envolvimento crescente da China 
no espaço económico regional é também uma fonte de apreensões para os seus 
vizinhos, temendo‑se o enfraquecimento das economias nacionais face à pujan‑
ça económica deste ator. Taiwan, por exemplo, depois do acordo entre a China 
e a ASEAN, pelo fato de não ser membro daquela organização, receou a perda 
de competitividade para outras economias da região. Em causa estava o efeito de 
“desvio de comércio” da produção menos competitiva de outros actores para o 
espaço integrado, fruto das facilidades aduaneiras, em prejuízo da sua produção 
industrial taiwanesa. Este fator económico acelerou os contactos entre Pequim e 
Taipé de forma a formalizarem um acordo preferencial de “criação de comércio” 
que pudesse minimizar os efeitos desviantes do acordo com a ASEAN. É neste sen‑
tido, impulsionando ainda mais os contatos bilaterais entre a China e Taiwan que 
foi assinado o Acordo de Cooperação Económica (ACE). Este Acordo tem servido 
o propósito do Presidente Ma Ying‑jeou de melhorar a economia da ilha, usufruin‑
do de uma maior abertura no Estreito por onde já passam quase metade das suas 
exportações. 
Do ponto de vista militar, há a considerar as persistentes reclamações de soberania, 
afirmações de poder, controlo marítimo e jogos geopolíticos nos mares da China. É 
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o lar de crescentes ameaças transnacionais, entre Estados desenvolvidos e Estados 
emergentes, regimes autoritários e democráticos. Por exemplo, o recife de Scarbo‑
rough é reclamado pela China, Filipinas, e Taiwan. A verdade é que neste domínio 
a posição chinesa não encontra legitimidade perante a Convenção das Nações Uni‑
das sobre o Direito do Mar (CNUDM), a qual nesta matéria tem defendido razões 
de proximidade territorial. Este fato não impede que a China siga uma estratégia 
de reivindicação territorial “expansiva”, que inclui o apertado patrulhamento des‑
tas ilhas, ilhotas e arquipélagos que frequentemente conduzem a querelas efetivas. 
Torna‑se interessante verificar, tal como refere Steve Tsang do China Policy Institute, 
que apesar de a China defender abertamente o princípio da “ascensão pacífica” 
tem permitido que individualidades do establishment reclamem ofensivamente a 
soberania de determinados espaços geográficos (Jane´s Defence Weekly, 2012: 37). 
Em Agosto de 2012, um incidente nas ilhas Diaoyutai/Senkaku, reclamadas pela 
China, o Japão e Taiwan, levantou novamente a problemática, colocando pressão 
as relações entre a China e o Japão, envolvendo igualmente movimentações navais 
e as habituais manifestações populares (Taipei Times, 2012a: 1). 
Torna‑se imperioso notar que tradicionalmente a China é uma potência continental 
e preocupada, sobretudo, com as dinâmicas da sua fronteira euro‑asiática. A sua 
propensão marítima foi relativamente reduzida, e quando se mais afirmou neste 
domínio, teve uma expressão pouco mais que regional. Embora apenas se conheça 
a operação contra a pirataria somali no Golfo de Áden, em 2009, como a única 
intervenção naval fora do ambiente regional, há uma clara tendência da China 
em projetar um maior poder e controlo sobre o espaço marítimo. Neste prisma, a 
ilha de Taiwan acaba por ser um dos elos de uma cadeia de controlo que a China 
pretende estabelecer na região. Já em 2006, o presidente Hu Jintao tinha ordenado 
aos comandantes do Exército Popular de Libertação (EPL) para construírem uma 
“poderosa Marinha popular” que pudesse defender os interesses marítimos, em 
particular as Linhas de Comunicação Marítima (LCM) que estabelecem a ligação a 
países exportadores de energia no Oceano Índico (Taipei Times, 2006: 1). 
Neste contexto, destaca‑se o início das operações do porta‑aviões Liaoning, apetre‑
chado com modernos sistemas de radar, caças J‑15 e mísseis anti‑aéreos FL‑3000N 
(Jane´s Defence Weekly, 2012: 34). 
Assim, a RPC mantem uma crescente vigilância nas 200 milhas marítimas da sua 
zona económica exclusiva, incluindo um apertado controlo ao “mapa das nove li‑
nhas” 4 (nanhai jiuduan xian) que envolvem as ilhas do Mar do Sul da China. Note‑se 
também que por estes circuitos também passam os fluxos energéticos que abastecem 
o Japão, a Coreia do Sul e Taiwan. Inclui‑se, numa perspetiva mais alargada, a pro‑
4  Trata‑se, na verdade, de um mapa produzido em 1947 pelo KMT (Richardson, 2010: 184). 
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teção das suas LCM entre a sua zona marítima exclusiva e o Golfo Pérsico, corredor 
por onde a China recebe grande parte dos seus recursos energéticos. Ao mesmo tem‑
po, a China pretende criar condições para a protecção e capacidade de evacuação de 
nacionais de países do Sudeste Asiático, em caso de necessidade e afastar a influên‑
cia americana na região. A criação da Organização de Cooperação de Xangai (OCX), 
impulsionada por Pequim, embora focalizada na região da Ásia Central, encobre 
mas confirma o objetivo de afastar os interesses americanos naquela região. Ao mes‑
mo tempo, parece clara a intenção de este controlo do espaço marítimo funcionar 
como o seu fortalecimento como potência regional e global (O´Rourke, 2012: 5).
Fruto da afirmação da China na região da Ásia‑Pacífico, também os EUA estão a 
direcionar as suas atenções para este espaço geográfico. Há uma crescente per‑
ceção na comunidade de segurança americana que dentro de duas décadas os 
EUA terão de partilhar a sua supremacia global com outros atores. Segundo o 
“Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” (2012), é indiscutível o papel dominante 
da China no plano económico e político internacional, confirmando as anteriores 
previsões feitas pela Goldman Sachs (2003: 1‑24). Num artigo da revista Foreign 
Policy, a Secretária de Estado Hillary Clinton apontou o presente século como 
sendo “o Século do Pacífico” para a política externa americana e que o futuro 
da geopolítica será decidido na Ásia, não no Afeganistão ou no Iraque, devendo 
os EUA estar no centro destes desenvolvimentos (Clinton, 2011; Clinton, 2011a: 
56‑63)5. Para além do Pacífico, podemos ainda acrescentar as movimentações no 
Índico como muito importantes para este novo século6. Em causa está, em grande 
medida, a ascensão da China e a sua crescente capacidade de influência no espa‑
ço asiático, ainda que enquadrada na retórica oficial da “ascensão” ou “desen‑
volvimento pacífico”. A Marinha americana está na linha da frente nos esforços 
da Administração Obama com a retirada progressiva do Iraque e do Afeganistão 
(Locklear, 2013). 
A consubstanciar a estratégia da Administração, surge a criação de um novo es‑
paço de cooperação regional denominado Trans-Pacific Partnership, o qual exclui 
a participação da RPC. Parece claro que este organismo tem a função de anular a 
capacidade dominante da China, sobretudo depois de se ter tornado o principal 
parceiro comercial da ASEAN, em substituição dos EUA. Em parte visa também 
5  Segundo Hillary Clinton (2011: 56‑63): “It is becoming increasingly clear that in the 21st century, the 
world’s strategic and economic center of gravity will be the Asia Pacific, from the Indian subcontinent 
to the western shores of the Americas. And one of the most important tasks of American statecraft over 
the next decades will be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, 
and otherwise – in this region.”  
6  Sobre este último aspeto vide, por exemplo Robert Kaplan (2012). Monsoon: The Indian Ocean 
and the Future of American Power. New York: Random House.
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contrariar a recessão económica interna desde 2008, aproveitando o impulso co‑
mercial daquela região. Em termos estratégicos, no regresso de Washington à 
arena asiática, os americanos têm estreitado os laços de cooperação com os países 
aliados de forma a formar um “contrapoder” à ascensão chinesa. Neste quadro 
incluem‑se as ligações com a Austrália, Coreia do Sul, Japão, Malásia, Vietname, 
Índia e Taiwan. Reconhece‑se que o interesse nacional americano em sintonia 
com os aliados regionais7 está agora centrado na Ásia‑Pacífico (Locklear, 2013).  
A Centralidade do “Fator China”
Para Taiwan, a China em toda a sua dimensão geográfica, socioeconómica, cul‑
tural, política e militar, é de tal forma evidente que se torna um “fator” incon‑
tornável na sua acção governativa. Tanto por necessidade, como por interesse, 
quer a sociedade civil como os responsáveis políticos da ilha, não resistem ao 
poder de atracção e influência do mercado continental. O fenómeno não passa 
só pela confrontação política e afirmação de poder naval da China mas também 
pela sua capacidade de absorver capital e pessoas do território insular. Repare‑
se, por exemplo, no fenómeno da “febre de Xangai” que tem seduzido massi‑
vamente muitos jovens taiwaneses a procurar naquela grande cidade chinesa 
novas oportunidades e condições de vida (Wang, 2009: 322‑346). Desde 1987, 
com a permissão de viajar para a China continental, concedida pelo Presiden‑
te taiwanês, Chiang Ching‑kuo (1978‑1988), filho de Chiang Kai‑shek, que se 
iniciou uma intensa vaga de interações entre insulares e continentais8. Nos pri‑
meiros quatro anos, residentes de Taiwan fizeram cerca de três milhões de visi‑
tas ao continente, enquanto 20 mil continentais visitaram Taiwan (as restrições 
de Taiwan à visita de continentais mantiveram‑se sempre mais apertadas do 
que o contrário). Seguindo a mesma lógica, também o investimento taiwanês 
aumentou exponencialmente no continente, cerca de 3 mil milhões para o mes‑
mo período. Ficaram conhecidos os empresários taiwaneses a operar na China 
continental, uma força ativa em termos económicos e influente nos meios po‑
líticos chineses locais. Em sentido contrário, o investimento chinês em Taiwan 
foi sempre inferior, pois este não detinha tantas facilidades de entrada (Clough, 
1993: 1) apesar do dinamismo económico no início do período das reformas 
7  Repare‑se, por exemplo, na cooperação estabelecida entre a Marinha australiana e americana, 
especialmente no porto de Darwin. 
8  Importa salientar que estas dinâmicas já se verificavam desde o início do processo de aber‑
tura chinês (1978), de forma dissimulada, desafiando as autoridades taiwanesas. Aliás, muitos 
empresários taiwaneses estavam já instalados na antiga colónia britânica. A partir de 1987 
verificou‑se, sobretudo, um abrandamento na política de fiscalização a estas dinâmicas por 
parte das autoridades taiwanesas que estavam a ser utilizadas pela “via de Hong Kong”. 
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económicas e a abertura na China a bens e pessoas que circulavam entre os 
dois lados, embora através de um circuito indireto que passava por Hong Kong 
ou Macau, conhecido por China Circle (Naughton, 1998: 3). Assim, entre 1978 e 
1994, o investimento taiwanês na China continental já representava 10% do to‑
tal do investimento estrangeiro, sem contar com os investidores taiwaneses an‑
teriormente radicados em Hong Kong (Hsing, 1998: 3). Aproveitando os sinais 
emitidos por Hu Jintao e a pressão da sociedade civil taiwanesa, as duas partes 
envolveram‑se em processos negociais mais activos desde 2008. Removeram‑se 
barreiras económicas e intensificou‑se a cooperação, assistindo‑se a acordos em 
muitas áreas de interesse comum. 
Apesar deste contexto, permanece o debate se esta crescente abertura e clima de 
cooperação torna ou não a ilha ainda mais vulnerável face à China continental. Em 
causa está a discussão sobre a natureza das relações bilaterais, isto é, se estão as‑
sentes em relações de “dependência” ou “interdependência”. Em grande medida, 
esta discussão divide‑se entre aqueles que defendem uma crescente intensidade 
das dinâmicas no estreito de Taiwan e outros que preconizam um desvio para ou‑
tros países terceiros. Julgamos, contudo, que o “fator China” tem uma tendência 
para tornar a relação sino‑taiwanesa numa lógica assimétrica que tem obrigado os 
responsáveis políticos taiwaneses a acelerar os contactos bilaterais. 
Por exemplo, o acordo para criação de uma área de comércio livre entre a ASE‑
AN e a China (2002) e as repercussões daí advindas, a que já fizemos referência, 
impulsionou a criação do Acordo de Cooperação Económica (ACE), assinado 
em 29 de Junho de 2010. O facto de Taiwan ter dificuldade de desenvolver a sua 
diplomacia livremente no espaço internacional, prejudicando a economia nacio‑
nal, é uma enorme vulnerabilidade para o governo insular. A própria postura do 
Partido Democrático Progressista (PDP) depois da derrota eleitoral de 2012 tem 
sido no sentido de uma maior abertura com a China. Também se questiona se a 
democracia em Taiwan e a divisão da sociedade civil em torno dois principais 
Partidos não é também um fator de enfraquecimento. A exclusividade no poder 
que o KMT teve durante décadas (1949‑1988), até ao levantamento da Lei Mar‑
cial, foi um fator de unidade que tornou a ilha mais compacta do ponto de vista 
político e na própria identidade. 
O investimento taiwanês na China tem sido uma fonte importante para o de‑
senvolvimento económico regional, sendo igualmente inegável a sua impor‑
tância na transferência de tecnologia para o território continental. Trata‑se de 
um questão delicada tendo em conta que esta tecnologia pode facilmente ser 
aproveitada para a modernização militar do EPL. É preciso não esquecer que 
a RPC mantém‑se condicionada no acesso à compra de tecnologia militar pelo 
embargo na venda de armas dos EUA e da União Europeia, a vigorar desde 
1989. Enquanto isso, permanece um clima de hostilidade em relação a Taiwan, 
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mostrando resistência a qualquer iniciativa que não se ajuste à política de 
unidade nacional chinesa, estando bem presente a promulgação da Lei Anti‑
secessão (2005) em que o Governo chinês admite a utilização de “meios não 
pacíficos” para evitar movimentos independentistas da ilha. Em consonância, 
acresce o clima de nacionalismo que, por um lado, serve os interesses parti‑
dários na ausência de estrutura ideológica e, por outro, obriga a uma defesa 
reforçada dos interesses nacionais. Em causa estão objetivos políticos há muito 
definidos como a criação do espaço da “Grande China”, em que se inclui Hong 
Kong e Macau. Em boa verdade, Taipé até aceita a existência de “uma China”, 
consenso que marcou positivamente as relações bilaterais em 1992. As dificul‑
dades residem no entendimento que se faz desta “China única” e na forma 
como se poderia resolver a questão. 
Desde 1995 até 2008, as relações entre a China e Taiwan foram marcadas por 
uma constante instabilidade, incompreensões e antagonismos sobre a interpre‑
tação do destino da ilha. Em grande medida, tal como afirma Richard C. Bush 
(2011: 274‑289) as “duas Chinas” recearam‑se entre si, julgando que “a outra 
parte” unilateralmente tomasse medidas que pudessem colocar em causa os 
seus interesses fundamentais. Enquanto Pequim temia que Taipé fechasse a 
possibilidade de uma “reunificação” (“unificação” para Taiwan), Taipé descon‑
fiava que a China colocasse o processo negocial num estado inevitável para a 
ilha. Esta “suspeita mútua” foi acompanhada, ora, por um crescente aumento 
do dispositivo militar chinês dirigido à ilha, enquanto a RC procurava reforçar 
a sua presença no espaço internacional. As divergências de posições fizeram 
perigar as relações bilaterais e poderiam ter degenerado em conflito militar en‑
tre os dois lados com possibilidades de envolvimento dos EUA, nomeadamente 
entre 1995‑1996. 
A modernização militar chinesa, as movimentações navais, as simulações de 
operações e vigilância e até espionagem no Estreito de Taiwan contribuem para 
a permanência de um clima de insegurança na região. A China possui o segundo 
maior orçamento de defesa no mundo, tendo sofrido um aumento de 12.7% em 
2011, num total de 91.5 mil milhões de dólares. Este facto enfraqueceu progressi‑
vamente a capacidade militar da ilha, cujo orçamento foi de 10,27 mil milhões em 
2011 (quadro 1). Para esta balança de poder, cada vez mais assimétrica, do ponto 
de vista militar, tem contribuído também a redução das despesas por parte da 
administração de Ma Ying‑jeou (Arthur, 2011: 48‑49).
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Quadro 1 – Comparação entre as forças militares Chinesas e Taiwanesas
Fonte: Arthur (2011: 52)
De acordo com o Relatório do Congresso dos EUA (2011: 2), em dezembro de 2010 
estavam direcionados à ilha de Taiwan cerca de 1000 a 1200 mísseis de curto alcan‑
ce. Este facto é um dos principais fatores para que China e Taiwan não avancem no 
estabelecimento de um acordo de paz, embora haja outras componentes diplomá‑
ticas. Para adensar o clima de incerteza, são igualmente frequentes as simulações 
militares de ataques a Taiwan por parte das forças armadas chinesas.9 Aliás, a Re‑
vista de Defesa Quadrienal (RDQ), reconhece que a crescente capacidade militar 
chinesa é o maior desafio de segurança de Taiwan. As forças armadas chinesas 
começaram a desenvolver novas missões as quais permitiram jogar um papel mais 
substancial e construtivo nos assuntos militares internacionais. Em grande medi‑
da, tal como adverte a RDQ de 2010, a falta de transparência, a natureza do desen‑
volvimento militar chinês e do processo de decisão, são fatores que legitimam a 
desconfiança em relação ao futuro e às intenções da China na Ásia e noutros espa‑
ços geográficos (Departamento da Defesa dos Estados Unidos da América, 2010: 
60). São particularmente desafiantes, a modernização da Marinha do Exército de 
Libertação Popular (MELP), a sua preocupação em desenvolver ações em águas 
profundas as quais constituem um desafio acrescido para a segurança de Taiwan. 
9  Por exemplo, um vídeo promocional sobre os sistemas de armamento chinês apresentado 
Zhuhai Air Show, em novembro de 2012, simulava o bombardeamento de bases militares em 
Taiwan. Entre o diverso armamento apresentado incluíam‑se os mísseis de funcionalidades 
diversas, M20, A100 e A100 (Taipei Times, 2012: 1).  
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O crescimento em dimensão, capacidade e profissionalismo da MELP nos últimos 
anos tem sido desafiante, quando o orçamento das forças armadas chinesas au‑
mentou para dois dígitos na última década. Para além do desenvolvimento de 
tecnologias de anti-access e area denial na região da Ásia‑Pacífico, foram também ad‑
quiridos ou fabricados sofisticados sistemas de defesa aérea e de mísseis guiados 
de longo alcance para operações marítimas – tais como o Houbei – aeronaves não 
tripuladas, submarinos, porta‑aviões, fragatas, destroyers, entre outros (Crowder, 
2012: 19; O´Rourke, 2012: 3‑37). 
Os Novos Desafios de Segurança e Defesa de Taiwan 
A chegada ao poder de Ma Ying‑jeou em 2008, do Partido Nacionalista do Kuomin-
tang (KMT), depois de oito anos de governação do Partido Democrático Progres‑
sista (PDP) liderado por Chen Shui‑bian, trouxe um novo rumo político à ilha10. 
Ma chegou com a convicção que o antecessor cometeu muitos erros de estratégia 
militar no que se refere à defesa da ilha e procurou distanciar‑se da governação 
anterior (Chen, 2009: 8). Um dos domínios em que se procurou demarcar uma 
diferença foi precisamente na defesa nacional, embora uma parte dos conceitos 
anteriores se mantivesse inalterado. Um ano depois do início do novo mandato, 
aparecia já expressa no QDR, uma nova estratégia de defesa nacional, muito em 
resposta às necessidades da sociedade civil e como um desafio à ala militar mais 
ortodoxa (Chen, 2009: 8). A ideia era cortar com as tendências mais desafiantes da 
governação de Ma Ying‑jeou que colocava em causa o equilíbrio no Estreito de 
Taiwan. Embora Chen tenha seguido no essencial a política do KMT, no final do 
seu segundo mandato (2004‑2008) tomou uma posição de maior confrontação face 
à RPC. Em abril de 2007, por exemplo, as agências noticiosas taiwanesas revelaram 
que as forças armadas da ilha simularam em computador ataques com mísseis a 
posições chinesas no Estreito de Taiwan (Huang, 2008: 257). 
A política presidencial de Ma passou a ser conhecida por “Hard ROC”11, que apesar 
de indiciar uma manifestação de força, na verdade toda a retórica oficial é mui‑
to centrada na construção de uma “defesa abrangente” (comprehensive defense), ou 
seja, um ambiente pacífico regional e na construção de paz. Em grande medida, 
10  Para a melhoria das relações bilaterais o autor considera igualmente influente o conjunto alar‑
gado e estratificado de crescentes interações informais e não‑governamentais desenvolvidas 
entre as duas comunidades. Ver Silva (2011: 199‑220). 
11  A estratégia “Hard ROC” (jogo de palavras fazendo uso da sigla Republic of China) criticada 
por algumas individualidades do meio militar, assenta no desenvolvimento de capacidades 
e infra‑estruturas militares defensivas e de protecção a eventuais ataques inimigos, incluindo 
operações conjuntas que possam anular forças aéreas e navais, e capacidade de mobilização de 
reservas (MDNRC, 2009: 65).    
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tal como afirma York W. Chen (2009: 10), o conceito de “Hard ROC” parece indi‑
ciar toda uma estratégia de “fortificação defensiva”. A expressão foi amplamente 
apoiada pelo legislador Su Chi, posteriormente Secretário‑Geral do Conselho Na‑
cional de Segurança. Su sempre fora crítico do conceito de “Defesa Activa” da Era 
de Chen e chegou mesmo a bloquear o financiamento do MDT para a produção 
dos mísseis cruzeiro HF‑IIE. Como alternativa, propôs já naquela altura o conceito 
de “Hard ROC” que viria a ser usado por Ma na campanha eleitoral de 2008 (Chen, 
2009: 10). O conceito tornar‑se‑ia a base do entendimento de segurança de Taiwan 
por parte de Ma e seria introduzido e explicado nos documentos oficiais emitidos 
pelo MDT: 
“President Ma’s phrase in Chinese would translate: “solid as bedrock,” signifying a 
rock-solid and impregnable defensive force that, by implication, could not be dislodged, 
shattered, or breached by a numerically superior enemy force during an attempt to atta-
ck or invade ROC territory. The abbreviation for the Republic of China, ROC, happens 
to rhyme with the word “rock” in English, allowing word play that does not exist in the 
original Chinese formulation.” (MDNRC, 2009: 10)
É indiscutível que a paz é um fator central nas linhas orientadoras da estratégia de 
defesa nacional de Taiwan. A Constituição da RC, no seu artigo 137, faz referência, 
para além da salvaguarda da defesa nacional, à necessidade de “preservação de 
um mundo de paz” (GPRC, 2012). Assim, a prevenção da guerra e de conflitos, a 
defesa do território nacional, a preparação de respostas de contingência e a estabi‑
lidade regional estão entre as grandes estratégias de defesas nacionais de Taiwan. 
Há uma clara intenção de reforçar o princípio da “defesa preventiva” (preventive 
defense) e um enfoque em Taiwan como construtor de paz (peacemaker), evitando 
qualquer tipo de confrontação sem abdicar da participação em processos de co‑
operação regional. A ideia é promover dinâmicas de Confidence Building Measures 
(CBM) e outras medidas preventivas (MDNRC, 2009, 62), tal como comprovam 
os esforços de mediação na crise Senkaku/Diaoyutai. Ao mesmo tempo, a ilha 
pretende respeitar os acordos internacionais, em especial, no que se refere ao de‑
senvolvimento de armas nucleares e de armas de destruição maciça. 
O maior desafio ao papel de Taiwan como ator de paz é a sua relação agridoce com 
a RPC. O facto de a China não ter diminuído o seu arsenal militar em relação a 
Taiwan obriga a uma maior preocupação dos responsáveis políticos taiwaneses no 
reforço e modernização dos seu arsenal militar. Mesmo o cenário de entendimento 
entre Taipé e Pequim, envolvendo dinâmicas económicas, científicas, desportivas 
e culturais entre os dois lados, não tem acompanhado o mesmo tipo de avanços 
no domínio político. Desta forma, as preocupações de segurança mantêm‑se rela‑
tivamente inalteradas, embora teoricamente as possibilidades de uma confronta‑
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ção militar sejam cada vez mais improváveis. Poder‑se‑ia pensar que o clima de 
crescente cooperação económica e as interacções sociais funcionariam como um 
elemento atenuante, o que não se tem verificado. Apesar de uma redução subs‑
tancial do orçamento para a defesa na ilha, este facto é inerente a uma procura de 
maior profissionalização, eficiência e modernização das Forças Armadas. Também 
se verifica que desde 2011 passaram a ser produzidos, em grande escala, os novos 
mísseis IIE, Hsiung Feng, com um alcance de 600 a 650 quilómetros. Estes mísseis 
cruzeiro estão estrategicamente a ser colocados para atingirem território chinês, 
um facto totalmente novo neste contexto. Assim, enquanto a China tem cerca de 
1600 mísseis dirigidos à ilha, Taiwan aparece agora com um arsenal de 100 mísseis 
dirigidos ao continente (Dudley, 2012). 
A par das questões estritamente bélicas, há a considerar o constrangimento exer‑
cido pela China à diplomacia de Taiwan. A RC não tem participação em muitos 
organismos internacionais o que prejudica a sua economia e política de defesa. 
Neste prisma, o acesso a tecnologia exterior e a venda de armas a Taiwan permane‑
ce difícil, embora os EUA tenham a “obrigação” de o fazer de acordo com o Taiwan 
Relations Act (1979). A pressão que exerce a RPC visa manter a sua capacidade coer‑
civa sobre Taiwan, em especial evitando o desenvolvimento das suas capacidades 
aéreas impedindo a compra de aviões de combate (F‑5, FX, Mirage, F‑16 ou F‑35), 
bem como mísseis balísticos (US‑Taiwan Business Council, 2011: 31). 
Apesar das vulnerabilidades apontadas a Taiwan, é interessante analisar como al‑
guns observadores vêm em Taiwan uma enorme capacidade de influência, nomea‑
damente ao nível do seu soft power (Waterman, 2012). Embora a China tenha permi‑
tido que Taiwan participasse como observador na Organização Mundial de Saúde 
(Tatlow, 2012), continua a travar a sua entrada noutros organismos internacionais. 
Ao mesmo tempo, o número de Estados com quem tem relações diplomáticas ofi‑
ciais vai‑se reduzindo, fruto da pressão exercida por Pequim.12 
Outro elemento importante na política de defesa de Taiwan é a ideia de “trans‑
formação”, no sentido em que visa a modernização, eficiência, planificação, co‑
operação e equilíbrio das forças militares. Desde logo, há uma clara intenção de 
reestruturar os recursos disponíveis, em termos de organização e capacidades de 
operação, procurar parcerias, reequilibrar estratégias militares e uma melhor arti‑
culação entre os setores estratégicos civis e as tecnologias de defesa (transferência 
de tecnologia). Outras necessidades prementes são a implementação de um siste‑
ma funcional de voluntariado, o desenvolvimento dos recursos humanos, a gestão 
de gastos e aquisição de equipamentos militares, e uma articulação entre a política 
12  Por exemplo, em dezembro de 2012, a Secretaria de Relações Externas das Honduras ratificou a 
abertura de relações oficiais com a RPC (El Heraldo, 2012) – mais um golpe para a diplomacia 
de Taiwan.
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de defesa e as necessidades da sociedade civil. Há uma clara preocupação com a 
corrupção nas forças armadas tendo em conta o efeito negativo que acarreta. Os 
subornos e a corrupção generalizada pesam na moral interna dos efectivos e acaba 
por trespassar para a sociedade civil. 
Além disso, há uma tentativa de aumentar as parcerias e caminhos para o esta‑
belecimento de contactos com atores regionais no sentido de criar plataformas 
de entendimento e cooperação conjunta ao nível da segurança. Será importante 
também a criação de uma política de cooperação ao nível da segurança regional, 
desenvolvendo operações conjuntas no âmbito dos conceitos estratégicos da “de‑
fesa resoluta e dissuasão credível”. Através desta estratégia, as forças armadas 
de Taiwan pretendem melhorar a eficiência de operações conjuntas, “sustentação 
estratégica e determinação táctica”, anulando as tentativas de avanço rápido por 
parte do inimigo. São cruciais as operações C4ISR13, operações de informação (IO), 
de guerra eletrónica, operações conjuntas, guerra assimétrica, mobilização de re‑
servas, logística e capacidades de combate intangíveis (MDNRC, 2009: 6‑7). Assim 
tem sucedido nos contatos com o Japão – apesar de alguns desentendimentos – e 
com os EUA, e que inclui a venda de armamento, apesar das críticas de Pequim. 
Ou seja, com a “viragem” dos EUA para o espaço da Ásia‑Pacífico Taiwan está a 
recuperar a sua importância.
Em termos de ameaças não‑tradicionais, a RC enfrenta o desafio imenso dos desas‑
tres naturais, considerados como um risco à segurança nacional (MDNRC, 2011: 
13). Por exemplo, em agosto de 2009, o tufão Morakot revelou deficiências ao nível 
militar e político no auxílio às populações locais. Neste sentido, urge uma maior 
articulação entre as forças militares e civis na procura de soluções para calamida‑
des deste género. Por outro lado, a abertura de fronteiras entre a China e Taiwan 
e as relações estreitas com os EUA podem colocar a ilha sobre a mira de eventuais 
ataques terroristas. Além disso, as doenças infecto‑contagiosas, tradicionalmente 
de fácil propagação na região, são um factor de enorme preocupação. Acrescem 
ainda outras inquietações tais como a pirataria marítima e os ataques de cibernau‑
tas, estes muito desenvolvidos na China continental. 
Conclusões
Em termos dos desafios de defesa e segurança, podemos dizer que a ilha de Taiwan 
se debate com questões convencionais e não convencionais, divididas entre o do‑
mínio político, diplomático, económico e militar. É um facto que as relações no 
Estreito de Taiwan têm melhorado substancialmente desde a eleição Ma Ying‑Jeou, 
13  Na terminologia anglo‑saxónica, as siglas C4ISR significam Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance e Reconnaissance. 
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em 2008, e da sua reeleição em 2012, o que é visível no aumento exponencial dos 
diálogos e contatos diretos. Ao mesmo tempo, os responsáveis políticos de Taiwan 
têm aproveitado para promover uma imagem de pacificadores nas suas relações 
com a RP – incluindo o papel de mediadores na região – o que tem agradado subs‑
tancialmente à diplomacia americana. A competição em redor das ilhas Senkaku/
Diaoyutai, por exemplo, tem servido para Taiwan reforçar este papel, manten‑
do uma posição equidistante em relação aos interesses de soberania da RPC. Na 
prossecução desta postura, Ma tem imposto um modelo de segurança apelidado 
de “Hard ROC”, assente, sobretudo, em aspectos defensivos, na transformação 
e na prevenção de conflitos. A ideia é não entrar em confrontação com a China, 
mantendo‑se o equilíbrio da “não unificação e não independência”. Neste projeto, 
inclui‑se também a transformação das forças armadas taiwanesas, no sentido de 
uma maior transparência, modernização, e reestruturação de forma a responder 
às necessidades. A redução do investimento taiwanês no domínio da defesa pode 
indiciar uma vulnerabilidade face à crescente cooperação com a China continen‑
tal. No entanto, para além da venda crescente de armamento pela Administração 
Obama, verifica‑se uma preocupação centrada na eficiência e modernização, o que 
implica uma boa utilização de recursos disponíveis. 
Embora seja inegável que a relação entre Taiwan e a China esteja na sua melhor 
fase, persistem muitas dificuldades do ponto de vista político. Pequim continua a 
pressionar a diplomacia taiwanesa, uma das principais amarras quanto à defesa 
dos interesses nacionais de Taipé. Embora tenha permitido a entrada de Taiwan 
como observador na OMS, a RPC impede que a ilha participe em muitos fora e 
organismos internacionais. Importa salientar que a China não coloca de parte a 
possibilidade de usar “meios não pacíficos” para resolver a questão de Taiwan, 
para além de manter um elevado arsenal balístico dirigido ao território insular. 
Ao mesmo tempo, dirige grande parte da sua estratégia militar para as zonas 
costeiras e vias marítimas, numa projeção naval para toda a região da Ásia‑Pa‑
cífico e Índico. 
Também a pujança comercial, política, diplomática e cultural da RPC continental 
são uma grande preocupação para Taipé, na medida em que enfraquece a condi‑
ção negocial taiwanesa, sem deixar de perceber que o mercado chinês é também 
uma oportunidade. Acrescem ainda questões de segurança não tradicionais, in‑
cluindo os desastres naturais, as doenças infecto‑contagiosas, o contrabando, a 
pirataria e os ataques cibernéticos. Finalmente, um dos maiores desafios à sua 
segurança é a crescente competição e tensão nos mares da China, incluindo o re‑
direcionamento estratégico dos EUA para a Ásia‑Pacífico. Parece‑nos que a ilha, 
face aos mais recentes desenvolvimentos, volta a estar no centro das atenções 
de Washington e, gradualmente irá assumir uma maior importância nos jogos 
geopolíticos regionais. 
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Resumo
Estratégia Nuclear e Mudança de Liderança na 
Coreia do Norte: Velho Soju numa Garrafa Nova
Sob as lideranças de Kim il‑sung e Kim Jong‑il, 
a Coreia do Norte desenvolveu uma estratégia 
nuclear que misturava ciclicamente ações de con‑
fronto e aproximação junto dos restantes atores do 
palco político do Nordeste Asiático. Essa estratégia 
visava evitar o fim do programa nuclear de Pyon‑
gyang e, de modo complementar, procurava extrair 
benefícios internacionais através de negociações. 
Ao suceder ao seu pai, Kim Jong‑un trouxe sinais 
de transformação ao nível da imagem pública da 
liderança, da predominância dos militares no regi‑
me, e da reforma económica. Contudo, a tendência 
transformadora da nova liderança não se estendeu 
à estratégia nuclear. Kim Jong‑un manteve basica‑
mente intacta a estratégia herdada de Kim Jong‑il, 
uma opção que é perfeitamente ilustrada pelo tes‑
te nuclear de 12 de Fevereiro de 2013. Este artigo 
oferece uma explicação para o facto de a mudan‑
ça de líder não ter afetado a estratégia nuclear da 
Coreia do Norte, argumentando que tal se deve à 
persistência de um contexto internacional negativo 
para a sobrevivência do regime norte‑coreano e à 
fragilidade política de Kim Jong‑un a nível interno.
Abstract
Under the leaderships of Kim Il‑sung and Kim 
Jong‑il, North Korea developed a nuclear strategy 
that cyclically mixed acts of confrontation and 
engagement towards other actors in the political 
stage of Northeast Asia. That strategy sought to 
avoid the end of Pyongyang’s nuclear program 
and, in a complementing way, to extract interna‑
tional benefits through negotiations. When he 
succeeded his father, Kim Jong‑un signalled trans‑
formation at the levels of leadership’s public im‑
age, the military predominance in the regime, and 
economic reform. However, that transformative 
tendency did not reach nuclear strategy. Kim Jong‑
un basically kept intact the strategy inherited from 
Kim Jong‑il, an option that is perfectly illustrated 
by the nuclear test of 12 February 2013. This article 
offers an explanation for the fact that leadership 
change did not affect nuclear strategy, arguing that 
it was due to the persistence of an international 
context that is negative for the survival of the 
North Korean regime and to the political fragility 
of Kim Jong‑un at domestic level.   
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Introduction
North Korea has the estimated ability to produce at least half a dozen plutonium‑
based nuclear weapons, started a program of uranium enrichment, and has been 
improving its ballistic deployment systems (Nikitin, 2013). Whether those capabili‑
ties are actually operational or constitute mere paper tigers, North Korea’s nuclear 
program became a central security concern in Northeast Asia. Since Pyongyang 
was confronted about the development of a nuclear program in the 1980s, its inter‑
national “nuclear strategy” – the set of planned actions whose purpose is to bring 
North Korea as close as possible to its preferred international outcome at the level of 
nuclear policy1 – has consistently followed a broadly predictable pattern, despite the 
image that North Korea is an unpredictable actor. Developed under Kim Il‑sung and 
Kim Jong‑il, that strategy is a cyclical combination of engagement and confrontation 
actions that end up preventing the denuclearization outcome sought by other North‑
east Asia’s political actors, which include the United States (US) due to its military 
presence in the region. It is evident that “leadership change” – Kim Jong‑un succeed‑
ing his late father, Kim Jong‑il – had a transformative impact at some domestic po‑
litical levels but Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy remained unaffected. In fact, despite 
showing signs of convergence towards the preferences of other actors in Northeast 
Asia – less conservative image, willingness to decrease the weight of the military in 
the regime, and signaling interest in economic reform – Kim Jong‑un did not alter 
the nuclear strategy of his predecessors, as reflected by the recent nuclear test on 12 
February 2013. In this sense I suggest that nuclear strategy under Kim jong‑un has 
been old soju in a new bottle: an old strategy used by a new leadership. In this con‑
text, my goal is to answer the following question: why was North Korea’s nuclear 
strategy fundamentally unaffected by leadership change? 
It is assumed here that North Korean leaders, as any other political leader, are 
instrumentally rational actors when they make foreign policy choices: they have 
pre‑defined preferences over outcomes and beliefs about which actions lead to 
each outcome, seeking to maximize their political profits (Bueno de Mesquita, 
2006: 308). Hence, this perception of rationality is noncommittal to the moral merit 
of actors’ goals or the quality of the actors’ performance in the pursuit of political 
profits. I consider that the basic goal of leaders is to remain in power by tack‑
ling international and domestic challenges to its leadership. At international level 
1  On the general definition of strategy see Frieden (1999: 41).  
*Este artigo descreve e analisa acontecimentos ocorridos até 20 de fevereiro de 2013.
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a political leader must tackle military threats to national integrity and economic 
outcomes that decrease available capital to fund his or her policies; whereas at 
domestic level a leader must focus on keeping a support coalition that sustains 
her or him in power. Given this analytical framework, I argue that Kim Jong‑un 
was internationally and domestically constrained to maintain the nuclear strategy 
of Kim Jong‑il, since the international position of North Korea and his fragility as 
leader prevented policy choices that led to denuclearization. 
The following section outlines North Korea’s nuclear strategy under Kim Il‑sung 
and Kim Jong‑il, describing the most relevant focal points that reflect the applica‑
tion of that strategy. Section 3 briefly explains the success of that nuclear strategy, 
reflected in the regime’s ability to keep its nuclear program alive despite the 
opposition of its powerful foe and ally, the US and China. In Section 4 I review 
the process of leadership change in Pyongyang, examining the rise to power of 
Kim Jong‑un and its transformative political impact at domestic level. Section 5 
describes the fundamental elements defining the nuclear strategy followed by 
the new leader up to the nuclear test of February 2013, highlighting its similar‑
ity to his father’s strategy. Section 6 explains how international and domestic 
constraints shaped the nuclear strategy of Kim Jong‑un. Finally, Section 7 sums 
up the findings.
       
Nuclear Strategy before Kim Jong-un
Due to its fragility North Korea was constrained to develop nuclear weapons. 
In principle Pyongyang was aware that other regional actors – US, South Korea, 
China, Japan, and Russia – would try to terminate its nuclear program. Therefore 
Pyongyang needed to develop a strategy in order to prevent the end of its program 
and if possible use it to obtain capital, energy or food aid through international 
bargaining. Accordingly, a strategy was developed by Pyongyang under Kim Il‑
sung and consolidated under Kim Jong‑il. What was that strategy and how did it 
shape the international behavior of North Korea? 
Threatened by the might of the US and by its own inability to reform the coun‑
try’s economy due to the risks of absorption by a more powerful South, nuclear 
weapons constituted a very useful solution to North Korea. In principle, those 
weapons could achieve three goals essential to the regime of Pyongyang: to deter 
external military attacks; to extract political and economic benefits from other 
countries; and to increase control over the population by booming the popularity 
of leaders and dissuading foreign states that wish to promote regime change in 
North Korea. Additionally, those weapons could bolster the domestic position of 
North Korean leaders. In this setting, the primary goal of Kim Il‑sung and Kim 
Jong‑il was to keep the nuclear program alive and the secondary one was to ob‑
tain material concessions to compensate for the deficient output of their malfunc‑
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tioning economic structures. The best scenario for Pyongyang would be the one 
in which the international “community” or at least the most powerful actor in the 
system – the US – recognized its nuclear status, while the worst scenario would 
be forced denuclearization in exchange for mere economic benefits. Given that 
the best scenario was unlikely in the short‑term and the worst scenario would be 
damaging for the sustainability of the regime, North Korea opted for a strategy of 
cyclical engagement‑confrontation that ultimately prevented denuclearization: 
firstly, engagement by denying any wrongdoing or demonstrating openness to 
denuclearization by negotiating a deal involving minor and major concessions2 
in exchange for benefits; secondly, confrontation through nuclear tests, ballistic 
missile launches, military provocations, or political rhetoric, in order to impose 
the implementation of acquired benefits, to avoid making major concessions, or 
to force the return of stalled negotiations; thirdly, engagement at subsequent de‑
nuclearization negotiations – thus simultaneously closing and opening the cycle 
– which eventually collapses again due to a new act of confrontation. 
This mixed strategy was challenging for actors interacting with North Korea. Al‑
though one could grasp if Pyongyang benefited from engaging or confronting at 
a given period in time (Magalhães, 2006, 2011), it was highly problematic to deter‑
mine when engagement and confrontation would actually occur – especially the 
duration of engagement and the occurrence of acts of confrontation that do not 
involve logistical processes that are easily detectable by systems of intelligence. To 
predict the behavior of any state is already hard enough – to say the least – but in 
the case of Pyongyang that task became virtually impossible due to the secretive 
informal political structures that lay under the regime’s formal ones (McEachern, 
2010; Cha, 2012; Park and Snyder, 2013).  
I suggest that North Korea’s nuclear strategy had three nuanced phases before 
Kim Jong‑un’s rise to power. The first phase lasted from the moment North Korea 
joined the Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT) up to the death of Kim Il‑sung (1985‑
1994); the second one regards Kim Jong‑il’s strategy before Pyongyang acknowl‑
edged the possession of nuclear weapons (1994‑2004); and the third one concerns 
the post‑acknowledgment period until Kim Jong‑il’s death (2004‑2011). The strate‑
gy’s fundamental engagement‑confrontation structure remained unaltered but the 
nuances came from the ability to exert confrontation, which increased as a function 
of Pyongyang’s perceived military capabilities. The more powerful North Korean 
military capabilities were perceived to be, the more confrontational Pyongyang 
2  Minor concessions being those that do not destroy the nuclear program – such as moratoriums 
on testing, visits by IAEA inspectors, or closing of accessory infrastructure – and major ones 
being those that may destroy it – such as the submission of nuclear materials, the destruction of 
irreplaceable nuclear weapons and delivery systems, or the closing of essential infrastructures. 
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was able to become: hence Kim Il‑sung’s ability to confront its international coun‑
terparts was lower than Kim Jong‑il’s before the acknowledgement of nuclear 
weapons, and Kim Jong‑il’s confrontational ability increased after that acknowl‑
edgment. 
Pyongyang’s quest for nuclear weapons goes back to the 1960s but it would only 
be accomplished in the post‑Cold War period. During the Cold War Pyongyang’s 
relations with Moscow were damaged by several episodes – such as Joseph Sta‑
lin’s weak support in the Korean War – but it was evident that the Soviets would 
prefer to pay the costs of military and economic assistance rather than the political 
costs of a pro‑Seoul reunification. Such Soviet predisposition was vital for North 
Korea due to the decline of its economy in relation to South Korea and to their 
inability to autonomously prevent a potential invasion by Seoul and Washington. 
Pyongyang’s economic shortages and military weakness could be compensated 
by Moscow but there was a price to pay at the level of defense autonomy: the 
Soviets rejected the development of North Korean nuclear weapons. In this sense, 
the Pyongyang’s Juche ideology of self‑sufficiency was sacrificed on the altar of 
Moscow’s economic and military umbrella. 
Although Soviet patronage constrained the development of a North Korean nu‑
clear program it was not able to stop it, especially when two trends in the 1980s 
became obvious to Pyongyang: Soviet decline and Moscow’s approximation to 
Seoul. The sense of vulnerability of Pyongyang increased proportionately to those 
growing trends and prompted the effective development of a military nuclear 
program, despite the Soviet and international efforts to prevent it. Such efforts 
pushed North Korea to join the NPT on 12 December 1985, which I consider to 
symbolically mark the beginning of the regime’s nuclear strategy of engagement‑
confrontation. After years of international suspicion and tension about North 
Korea’s program, in 1992 Pyongyang signed the Joint Declaration on the Denu‑
clearization of the Korean Peninsula with Seoul and finally signed the safeguards 
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).3 However, those 
actions of engagement towards the international community and the agreement 
with its Southern neighbor were merely smoke and mirrors: the development a 
nuclear program was a rational aspiration that those agreements could not su‑ 
ppress. When the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 signaled Soviet Union’s inability 
to protect allied regimes, it became demonstrated that Moscow’s support would 
no longer be a sufficient condition for regime survival in North Korea. Therefore, 
3  The Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Penin‑
sula was signed on 20 January 1992 and the safeguards agreement was signed on 30 January 
1992. See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t297463.htm and http://www.iaea.org/Pub‑
lications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf403.shtml .
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when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, North Korea was already effectively de‑
veloping its nuclear program. 
The post‑Cold War brought great international and domestic challenges to North 
Korea’s “Great Leader”, Kim Il‑sung. At international level Pyongyang had lost 
its most important economic and military ally; the US was the only superpower; 
South Korea had become the magnet of reunification; and communist regimes had 
lost credibility. At domestic level, without Moscow’s support Pyongyang faced 
economic degradation and was unable to reform its centralized economic system 
due to the fear of unleashing a Southern absorption. Hence, if the development of a 
military nuclear program was desirable during the Cold War, it became absolutely 
essential in the post‑Cold War.    
When in the period of 1993‑1994 the US confronted North Korea about the nuclear 
weapons both countries were on the brink of war. However, following a visit by 
former US President Jimmy Carter, Kim Il‑sung agreed to negotiate in June 1994. 
Unluckily for Pyongyang, Kim Il‑sung died in July and thus the regime’s posi‑
tion at the negotiation table became obviously weaker. The crisis ended up solved 
through the Agreed Framework of October 1994 signed by North Korea and the 
US.4 Despite its weak negotiation position, this agreement ended up being positive 
to North Korea. The inclination of the United States to sign that agreement can be 
explained by the perception that the regime of Pyongyang would soon collapse 
(Mazzetti, 2006). In fact, that ended up being an apparently safe bet: Kim Il‑sung 
left North Koreans orphans of their “Great Leader”; economic continue declining; 
and natural disasters devastated the country, provoking an unprecedented famine 
which according to an informed estimation led to a number of deaths that ranged 
from 600,000 to 1 million (Haggard and Nolan, 2007: 1). In this context Washington 
did not have incentives to fulfill its end of the bargain but, contrarily to the expec‑
tations, Pyongyang survived.  
Kim Jong‑il continued to signal engagement with the US by supposedly com‑
plying with the Agreed Framework. However, Washington was being slow on 
delivering the agreed benefits, required by Kim Jong‑il to finance its military 
programs, to please the political‑military elites that sustained him in power, and 
4  The Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea was signed on 21 October 1994. In sum, North Korea agreed to respect 
the inter‑Korean Joint Declaration of 1992, to remain in the NPT, to allow IAEA inspections, 
not to reprocess nuclear fuel, and to comply with the safeguards agreement; the US agreed 
to organise the provision of two light water reactors, to deliver 500,000 tons of heavy fuel 
oil each year, and to formally assure that it would not threat to use or use nuclear weapons 
against North Korea. Moreover, both countries agreed to move towards the normalization of 
relations at political and economic levels. See http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/aptagframe.
pdf?_=1316553697&_=1316553697.
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mitigate the famine effects in order to avoid a popular revolt against the regime. 
This prompted Pyongyang to orchestrate a confrontation act, especially because 
it had achieved the technological ability to test ballistic missiles with a longer 
range than the medium‑range Rodong-1. Therefore in August 1998 North Korea 
presumably tested a Taepodong-1 missile while claiming to send a satellite into 
orbit, the Kwangmyeongseong-1.5 After the political dust settled, a new engage‑
ment period started with a bilateral meeting between North Korea and the US 
in Berlin in September 1999 – Pyongyang agreed with a moratorium on the tests 
of long‑range missiles in exchange for Washington’s partial lifting of sanctions 
(Song, 1999). The implementation of the Agreed Framework proceeded. In the 
meantime, apparently combining his ideology with the pragmatic recognition of 
the enduringness of Pyongyang’s regime, South Korea’s president Kim Dae‑jung 
– in office since early 1998 – had developed a novel engagement policy. Where‑
as the Kim Young‑sam, his predecessor, did not actively engage North Korea 
and was focusing on collapse scenarios, Kim Dae‑jung approached Pyongyang 
through his “sunshine policy” – which basically rejected the idea of a Southern 
absorption and promoted cooperation with the North. The Inter‑Korean Summit 
of June 2000 was the corollary of that policy, with Kim Jong‑il and Kim Dae‑jung 
meeting in Pyongyang. 
However, the severe political incompatibility between Pyongyang and Wash‑
ington prevented the normalization of relations and the difficult co‑existence 
of Bill Clinton with a Republican majority in Congress made the economical 
implementation of the Agreed Framework difficult to achieve. It became obvi‑
ous that the agreement was fatally wounded. The final blow came with the 
entry of George W. Bush into office in 2001. Ideologically conservative, Bush 
was less inclined than Clinton to negotiate with a totalitarian regime which 
supposedly sought to develop nuclear weapons. That inclination of Bush de‑
creased even more after the September 11 terrorist attacks led to a more asser‑
tive foreign policy against non‑allied countries and put nuclear terrorism on 
top of the list of Washington’s worst nightmares. In the beginning of 2002, the 
famous “axis‑of‑evil” categorization of Iraq, Iran and North Korea (Bush, 2002) 
represented the announced death of the Agreed Framework. Apparently trying 
to force the revival of the Agreed Framework, in October 2002 North Korea 
has been reported to have boasted about the existence of a nuclear program to 
an American official during a bilateral meeting in Pyongyang (Yoo, 2003: 105). 
The rupture with Washington was evident, so in January 2003 North Korea 
5  The launch occurred on 31 August 1998 and despite North Korean claims of success the sate‑
llite was never detected by other countries. 
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announced its retreat from the NPT and in April 2003 Pyongyang told American 
officials that it possessed nuclear weapons, solely one month after the invasion 
of Iraq – one of the members of the “axis of evil”. The exit from the NPT and 
the decay of North Korean‑American relations led to creation of the Six Party 
Talks (SPT), involving North Korea, the US, China, South Korea, Russia and 
Japan. Despite the efforts of North Korea to extract concessions, the first three 
rounds of the SPT – between August 2003 and June 2004 – did not produce the 
expected benefits. The lack of negotiation results – which despite allowing time 
to develop nuclear weapons did not deliver the much needed economic bene‑
fits – remained partially compensated with the engagement with Seoul, since 
the sunshine policy of Kim Dae‑jung continued to be promoted in its essence by 
the following president, Roh Moo‑hyun, who came to power in 2003.       
Since the improved relations with the South were far from being a guarantee 
of regime survival, Pyongyang made a provocation that marks the beginning 
of the third phase of its strategy. On 28 September 2004, Vice Foreign Minister 
Choe Sun‑ho publicly acknowledged at the UN that North Korea had turned 
plutonium from spent fuel rods into nuclear weapons as measure of self‑defense 
against the US nuclear threat (BBC, 2004). In February 2005 the public acknow‑
ledgment of possession of nuclear weapons was reiterated. As a result of those 
provocations, the fourth round of the SPT led to the Joint Statement of September 
2005.6 However, the rocky relationship between Pyongyang and the Bush admin‑
istration made implementation very difficult. In a move to strengthen its position 
and test technology, in July 2006 North Korea launched several missiles, inclu‑
ding a long‑range Taepodong-2. The latter launch was unsuccessful so Pyongyang 
needed to save its face and obtain another trump card for future negotiations. 
Hence North Korea opted for a new provocation: on 9 October 2006 it suppos‑
edly performed its first nuclear test. The international community protested and 
6  The Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six‑Party Talks was signed on 19 September 
2005. Regarding its practical obligations, North Korea agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons 
and programs, return to the NPT, respect the safeguards agreement, and implement the inter‑
Korean Joint Declaration of 1992 in exchange for: collective respect for its right to the peaceful 
use of atomic energy; the future discussion of a provision of a light water reactor; American 
acknowledgement that it does not deploy nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula and has 
no intentions to attack or invade North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons; South 
Korean pledge not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons and acknowledgement that these do 
not exist in its territory; North Korean‑American peaceful co‑existence, mutual respect for sov‑
ereignty, and move towards normalization of relations; North Korean‑Japanese move towards 
normalization of relations; energy assistance by the other five countries; South Korea’s provi‑
sion of 2 million kilowatts of electric power; and collective commitment to negotiate peace 
regime for the Korean peninsula. See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t212707.htm.
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the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved the condemnatory reso‑
lution 1718.7 
Negotiations returned and an implementation agreement was reached at the SPT 
in February 2007.8 The following months was marked by mutual actions of en‑
gagement, with North Korea closing down the Yongbyon in July 2007, the second 
Inter‑Korean Summit occurring in October 2007, the demolition of Yongbyon’s 
cooling tower in June 2008, and the October 2008 removal of North Korea from 
the American list of states that sponsor terrorism. However, North Korea was not 
interested in making major concessions and the US – despite Bush being substi‑
tuted by Barack Obama in January 2009 – was not inclined to reward Pyongyang 
for minor concessions. Obama’s policy of “strategic patience” reflected that logic. 
Moreover, Washington’s coordination with Seoul had improved after a new presi‑
dent came to power in early 2008, Lee Myung‑bak, a conservative politician that 
eschewed the engagement policies of presidents Kim and Roh (Voice of America, 
2010). Hence, North Korea was not able to compensate the estrangement with 
Washington through Southern aid and investment. In this context, time was ripe 
for another North Korean act of confrontation, hence continuing to implement 
its cyclical strategy. In April 2009 Pyongyang launched the Unha-2 rocket – with 
the reported goal of putting a satellite in orbit, the Kwangmyeongseong-2 – which 
was internationally considered a provocative missile test. In protest North Korea 
abandoned the SPT, increasing the intensity of the crisis. After little more than one 
month Pyongyang conducted its second nuclear test, on 25 May 2009, which led 
to the UNSC resolution 1874 in June.9 In July 2009 North Korea conducted further 
missile testing, though not involving long‑range devices. 
7  Basically, the UNSC Resolution 1718 of 14 October 2006 condemned the nuclear test; pro‑
hibited North Korea from performing nuclear and missile tests, suspended its missile and 
abandon its nuclear and suspend its missile programs; demanded the return to the NPT 
and respect for the safeguards agreement; authorised the inspection of shipments of cargo 
leaving and approaching North Korea; banned imports and exports of military material and 
technology related to the nuclear, ballistic and non‑nuclear weapons of mass destruction 
programs; authorised the freezing of overseas assets of individuals and companies related 
to the nuclear program and a travel ban regarding involved individuals and their families; 
prohibited exports of luxury goods to North Korea; established a sanctions committee; and 
called upon North Korea to return to the STP without preconditions and to work towards the 
implementation of the Joint Declaration of September 2005. See http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2006/sc8853.doc.htm.
8  The agreement on Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement was reached on 
13 February 2007. See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t297463.htm.
9  The UNSC Resolution 1874 was signed in 12 June 2009 and in essence it toughens the sanctions 
established by the UNSC Resolution 1718. See http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/
sc9679.doc.htm.
Livro134.indd   231 13/05/15   14:20
Nação e Defesa 232
Nuno Santiago de Magalhães
From that point onwards, Kim Jong‑il tried to force bilateral negotiations with 
the US or at least to achieve a strong bargaining position in the SPT. Since little 
progress was made in that sense, Kim Jong‑il went back to confrontation. In March 
2010 the South Korean corvette Cheonan was allegedly sank by North Korean for‑
ces, resulting in 46 deaths among crew members. Pyongyang denied the accusa‑
tion and inter‑Korean relations deteriorated rapidly, with the South demanding 
an apology. Those relations became deadlocked because neither country backed 
down. In order to put an end to the stalemate and perhaps to promote Kim Jong‑
un’s position in the regime, in November 2010 North Korea opted for another act 
of confrontation by shelling Yeonpyeong‑do – provoking the death of two civilians 
and two military. Also in November, North Korea let the world know about the 
existence of facilities of uranium‑enrichment. The year of 2011 was marked by a 
virtual stalemate in inter‑Korean relations – despite meetings to discuss low‑pro‑
file issues such as joint research in Baekdu‑san (The Chosun Ilbo, 2011a) or invita‑
tions for official visits to Kaesong (Agence France‑Presse, 2012) – which led to the 
perpetuation of the SPT blockade. When Kim Jong‑il passed away in December 
2011 there was still no visible progress. 
The Strategy’s Success
Altogether, this strategy has generically paid off for Kim Jong‑il because the re‑
gime survived him and the nuclear program was not shut down. But how can one 
explain that a small and poor country – with an estimated population of around 
24.5 million, GDP of 40 billion dollars, and GDP per capita of 1800 dollars10 – was 
able to resist the pressure of the US and China, respectively the major world power 
and the vital ally of Pyongyang?11 To answer the question one needs to address 
the fundamental preferences and strategies of these two actors, and explain how 
North Korea calculated its strategy accordingly. 
As mentioned above, the military nuclear program of North Korea was unanimous‑
ly repudiated by its five interlocutors in the SPT. Supposedly those states considered 
that the real danger of a nuclear North Korea laid especially in proliferation rather 
than nuclear holocaust. Namely, nuclear weapons threatened the international re‑
gime of non‑proliferation at state and sub‑state levels: at state level Pyongyang could 
directly export nuclear technology to other states and could indirectly lead to pro‑
liferation by provoking the nuclearization of South Korea, Japan, or even Taiwan; 
10  Estimative of 2012 for the population and of 2011 for the GDP (PPP) and GDP per capita (PPP). 
Central Intelligence Agency, “North Korea”, The World Factbook. Available at https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the‑world‑factbook/geos/kn.html.
11  For reflexions about denuclearization strategies see for example Cha and Kang (2003), Chang 
(2006), and Lee (2011).
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at sub‑state level the danger laid in the transfer of nuclear technology to terrorist 
organizations (Magalhães, 2006: 95‑96). The bigger states – US, China and Russia 
– were focusing almost exclusively such proliferation. On the other hand, South Ko‑
rean and Japan were also very anxious the possibility of escalation to a military con‑
flict that devastated South Korea and Japan. Proliferation was much more likely than 
a war, but the latter’s potential costs for Seoul and Tokyo were so high that ignoring 
that scenario was not an option.  Washington, Beijing and Moscow would certainly 
not enjoy the rise of such a conflict, but their costs would be lower in terms of territo‑
rial integrity. In this context, the US and China had a similar perspective about the 
dangers posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons. 
Since the perspectives of Washington and Beijing about the mentioned nuclear 
dangers were similar, what varied essentially was their risk‑propensity regard‑
ing how hard to push Pyongyang towards denuclearization. The risks of war 
on the one hand and regime collapse on the other were the most relevant ones. 
South Korea and Japan were more risk averse when it comes to war and South 
Korea and China were more risk averse when it comes to regime collapse – due 
to the short‑term socio‑economic costs of reunification for Seoul and the social‑
political‑strategic costs for China. Consequently in the case of China the stabil‑
ity of the North Korean regime was valued over regime collapse and result‑
ing denuclearization. Nonetheless, the strengthening of Pyongyang’s nuclear 
capability and its confrontational actions increased the propensity of Beijing 
moving towards positions closer to risk‑seekers – although not the extent of 
the US. In the case of the US and Russia neither one would profit from a new 
Korean war. As for regime collapse, Moscow would be displeased to lose an 
ally and Washington would have to incur in economic costs due to the likely 
ensuing regional economic crisis. However, these two states were less risk‑
averse than South Korea, China, and Japan, especially the Americans. In fact, 
although the existence of a threatening North Korea continued to be part of the 
narrative to legitimize American presence in South Korea and Japan, the utility 
of the regime decreased as a result of the development of its nuclear program, 
whose dangers were proportional to the degree of technological sophistica‑
tion achieved by Pyongyang. Since the latter had been increasing, the idea of 
a reunified Korea militarily protected by Washington up to the frontiers with 
China became more attractive – despite the economic and legitimacy costs. 
Therefore while the Chinese were risk‑averse in relation to heavy international 
and bilateral sanctions against North Korea, the US became risk‑seeking.  In 
that strategic setting, the US and China developed distinct strategies regarding 
North Korean denuclearization. 
Starting with the US, Washington was far from willing to recognize North Ko‑
rea’s nuclear status as it explicitly and implicitly did, respectively, in relation to 
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India and Israel. Another crack in the non‑proliferation regime was only worthy 
when it involved compensating political gains, which was clearly not the case. 
The alternative would be to make North Korea feel safe through normalization 
of the relations between both countries, as established in the SPT Joint Statement 
of 2005. In the process Pyongyang would demand not only a peace treaty and the 
start of diplomatic relations, but also a formal non‑aggression pact that assured 
non‑interference – in order to avoid the fate of Iraq and Libya, whose leaders 
would probably be alive if they had nuclear weapons. However, Washington 
could not opt for such degree of normalization because it would ruin its alliances 
with Seoul and Tokyo. As a result, the American strategy of containing the rise of 
China as an offshore balancer would be seriously jeopardized. Hence, despite the 
fact that the term “normalization” was often thrown around in political meetings 
and agreements, it was never really on the menu if one presupposes that Ameri‑
can leaders behaved in a substantively rational way. Since full normalization was 
not an option, the US preferred to put intense pressure on Pyongyang through 
bilateral and multilateral sanctions, while at the same time showing willingness 
to negotiate – in comparative terms, strong willingness with Clinton, medium 
with Obama, and weak with Bush. 
As for China, it was not willing to support Pyongyang’s nuclear program but still 
it preferred to sustain the regime with political, military and economic support 
rather than witnessing regime collapse. Beijing was not willing and capable to pro‑
tect Pyongyang to the extent of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but that 
support seemed crucial for the survival of Kim Jong‑il’s regime. Hence, in theory, 
a full aid cut by China would have thrown North Korea into the brink of collapse. 
Since Beijing does not wish that outcome to occur, it chooses a strategy that recon‑
ciles vital aid support with a mix of rewards and limited punishments contingent 
on Pyongyang’s nuclear policy. 
Aware of this, Pyongyang was able to resist the pressure of the US and managed 
the disapproval of its ally. North Koreans presumably knew that Washington 
was not willing to militarily enforce their preferences for denuclearization, so they 
defiantly endured pressure. Regarding China, Pyongyang was supposedly aware 
that Beijing would not permit the regime to collapse. As a result, Beijing could not 
make credible threats. Even if China voted damaging resolutions in the UNSC, 
scolded North Korea’s ambassador after a provocative act, or privately threatened 
to cut aid, it was rational for Pyongyang to assume that Beijing was limited in its 
ability to punish defection because it did not wish to risk a North Korean regime 
collapse. All in all, the powerful hands of the US and China were too large to open 
the small lock of Pyongyang’s nuclear safe. 
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Leadership Change: the Rise of Kim Jong-un
The process of leadership change gained a vital importance to the regime 
after Kim Jong‑il’s health declined in 2008. One can visualize two types of dyna‑
mics at play at that time: on the one hand Kim Jong‑il and his close “entourage” 
thinking about a successor that guaranteed regime stability; on the other hand a 
group of potential contenders – belonging or not to Kim’s entourage – thinking 
about the likelihood of successfully leading a coup d’état. The collective goal of 
Kim Jong‑il’s entourage was to find a leader that allowed a smooth political tran‑
sition, avoiding elite divisions and popular uprisings that could be fatal to the 
regime – provoking its collapse and very likely the trial of political leaders and 
officials controlling the mechanisms of Pyongyang’s domestic suppression. The 
four types of hypothetical leadership options available to the entourage were 
the following: Kim Jong‑il’s male offspring12 – Kim Jong‑nam, Kim Jong‑chul, 
or Kim Jong‑un; Kim Jong‑il’s sister or brother‑in‑law – Kim Kyong‑hui or Jang 
Sung‑taek; a leader not belonging to the Kim family, such as O Kuk‑ryol; or a co‑
llective decision‑making body. As for the group of contenders, it could advance 
with a singular or a collective alternative to leadership, coming from the military, 
the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), or even from the Kim family – such as Kim 
Jong‑nam or Kim Pyong‑il, Kim Jong‑il’s half‑brother. In the end, the outcome of 
leadership change was the following: the “Brilliant Comrade” Kim Jong‑un was 
chosen as leader – closely aided by members of his father’s entourage such as 
Kim Kyong‑hui, Jang, O, and Ri Yong‑ho – whereas the potential contenders did 
not make a move.
The appointment of Kim Jong‑un as successor was obviously advantageous to the 
regime’s stability due to the political weight of his family in relation to the elites and 
masses. Regarding the former, Kim Jong‑il had a solid influence over the Korean 
People’s Army (KPA) – the fundamental group in the regime. Due to his Songun 
policy – military primacy – Kim Jong‑il attracted the support of the armed forces 
by allocating economic resources in their favor, especially to the military elites of 
Pyongyang and to the nuclear program. The militaristic control of the regime was 
exerted through the National Defence Commission (NDC). Being the Chairman 
of the NDC and the Supreme Commander of the KPA, Kim Jong‑il controlled the 
military. Moreover, the “Dear Leader” also had a strong position in the WPK, be‑
ing its General Secretary. Such weight in the military and political pillars of the re‑
gime would lead one to suppose that a family member such as Kim Jong‑un would 
aggregate the support of such groups more easily than a political contender outside 
12  Given the patriarchal structure of North Korean society and the existence of three sons, the 
two daughters of Kim Jong‑il – Kim Sul‑song and Kim Yo‑jong – were virtually condemned to 
oblivion in the process of succession. 
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the Kim family. As for the popular allure of Kim Jong‑il among the masses, it was 
based upon the cult of personality that North Korean propaganda successfully con‑
structed around the Kims during decades, benefiting from a Confucian culture that 
emphasizes leadership and hierarchy. Kim Jong‑un would supposedly also benefit 
from such allure, especially give his physical resemblance with Kim Il‑sung. 
The costs of choosing Kim Jong‑un were basically related to five factors: age, 
origins of his mother, foreign education, lack of political experience, and the con‑
firmation that in practice the regime became a monarchy. Given the abovemen‑
tioned cultural Confucian structures in North Korea, age is a highly relevant 
factor in shaping social relations and in principle older members have preva‑
lence over younger ones. This could pose problems because most high officials 
of the regime were substantially older than Kim Jong‑un. As for his mother – Ko 
Young‑hee – Kim Jong‑un could be attacked by the fact she was an ethnical Ko‑
rean born in Japan, a country that remained on top of the regime’s hate list. In 
regard to his foreign education, Kim Jong‑un apparently studied in Switzerland 
and this could be received with scepticism by a regime that is notorious for its 
racist‑xenophobic narratives (see Myers, 2012). Regarding his inexperience, Kim 
Jong‑un did not have time to gain experience in the KPA or the WPK as his father 
did. Hence, despite the honors bestowed upon him and the hagiographic propa‑
ganda typical of the Kim “dynasty”, Kim Jong‑un’s inexperience would likely 
make many eyebrows rise in suspicion of his leadership ability. Lastly, the fact 
that another Kim was put in power would definitely make the regime intrinsi‑
cally connected with that family. That fact constituted a long‑term problem in 
terms of political narrative and, most importantly, made the regime dependent 
of suitable Kim heirs. 
After weighing the benefits and costs to the regime, the net profit of placing 
Kim Jong‑un in power was not as high as Kim Jong‑il would have wished, but 
it ended up being higher than that of other candidates considered by the entou‑
rage of the “Dear Leader”. Despite being older, Kim Jong‑nam and Kim Jong‑chul 
apparently were not adequate candidates due to the mismanagement of public con‑
duct of the former and to the personal traits of the latter. Kim Kyong‑hui seemed 
psychologically unstable and in a male‑dominated society her appointment would 
likely lead to contestation. As for Jang, despite seeming the most prepared alterna‑
tive for leadership, he lacked the essential popular charisma and legitimacy of the 
Kims – so necessary to guarantee social stability and national cohesion. Regarding 
the appointment of a leader outside the Kim family such as O or a junta led by a 
Kim or Jang, those solutions would lack the popular legitimacy or lead to a divi‑
sive decision‑making body, respectively.   
In relation to a revisionist leadership solution led by a contender within or outside 
the entourage, it would have few chances of succeeding. Firstly, contenders would 
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have difficulties in forming a successful coalition of supporters at the level of the 
elites because Kim Jong‑il and his entourage kept a tight control over the military 
and political structures, thus prohibitively increasing the risks of contestation. Sec‑
ondly, a revisionist solution would lack popular support. In these conditions, even if 
a coup was successful in the short‑term, elite dissension or popular rebellion would 
likely occur in the long‑term. Hence, potential contenders either remained silent or 
criticized the new leadership from a safe distance, as Kim Jong‑nam did.     
When Kim Jong‑il died the process of leadership change was already prepared 
and went smoothly without relevant reactions against it. On 26 December 2011 
Kim Jong‑un was declared “Supreme Leader” of the country – following his father 
– a title that he has accumulated with the positions of Supreme Commander of 
the KPA, First Secretary of the WPK, Chairman of the Military Committee of the 
WPK, and most importantly, First Chairman of the NDC. In that setting, the new 
leader felt comfortable enough to promote transformations or signal them at cer‑
tain political levels. The most noticeable transformations refer to public image but 
more subtle and crucial ones also seem to have been promoted by the new leader, 
namely by decreasing the preponderance of the military and signaling its willing‑
ness to perform economic reforms.  
Concerning the dimension of public image, Kim Jong‑un is evidently different from 
Kim Jong‑il. In particular, the new leader opted for a less conservative posture in 
comparison to his father. For instance, Kim Jong‑un gives New Year speeches (Kore‑
an Central News Agency, 2013), appears in public with his wife Ri Sol‑ju (Choe Sang‑
hun, 2012), and watches shows featuring North Korean “girls‑bands” and Disney 
characters (Korean Central News Agency, 2012; The Telegraph, 2012). This type of 
behavior was highly unusual in Pyongyang when Kim Jong‑il was leader and seems 
to reveal an attempt to attract popular support on behalf of Kim Jong‑un. 
As for the military, Kim Jong‑un seems to be promoting a gradual shift in terms 
of political and economic control. Although the Songun policy is still in place and 
the military remain the most important group in the regime, the new leader made 
options that reveal a gradual shift. Besides the usual purges in processes of power 
transition in North Korea – which seems to have included the protégés of O (The 
Chosun Ilbo, 2011) – Kim Jong‑un has been making the military lose face with 
highly symbolical gestures. For instance, Kim Jong‑un removed Ri – a well known 
supporter of Songun – from power (Yonhap, 2012), promoted a shift in economic 
control from the military to the cabinet (Yonhap, 2012a), and failed to visit the 
legendary 105th Tank Division in the beginning of 2013 (Lee, 203).  Thus, although 
the military are still a force to be reckoned with in Pyongyang, Kim Jong‑un seems 
interested in decreasing their weight. 
Regarding economic reforms, despite not having advanced with concrete ones 
Kim Jong‑un’s seems to be more interested than his father in promoting them. Kim 
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Jong‑il promoted some limited reforms13, but his low enthusiasm is reflected by the 
fact that he regarded reforms à la Beijing as a “Trojan horse” against socialism that 
would not have the same beneficial results as in China and Vietnam (Rowen, 2003). 
Besides having picked up the projects started by his father, there are subtle signals 
that Kim Jong‑un seeks to surgically promote further changes in North Korea’s 
economical structures, very likely guided by Jang. The signs are discourse refe‑ 
rences to “radical” economic change14; the pushing aside of officials that opposed 
economic reform15; and the fact that it was reported that North Korea was ask‑
ing for international advice on foreign investment (Spiegel, 2013). The conserva‑
tive opposition and the dangers of reform leading to absorption by Seoul are still 
present, but Kim Jong‑un seems slightly less risk‑averse than Kim Jong‑il when it 
comes to the promotion of liberal reforms. 
In conclusion, the selection of Kim Jong‑un as leader ended up being the less risky 
choice when it comes to the promotion of regime stability in the short‑term. Other 
Northeast Asian actors were surely pleased to see indications that Kim Jong‑un 
was less conservative, militaristic, and averse to economic reforms than his father 
– signs that perhaps he was more likely to support dialogue, to abstain from de‑
veloping military programs, and to pursue economic reforms that required inter‑
national cooperation. However, Kim Jong‑un was quite adamant in not promoting 
denuclearization, keeping North Korea’s nuclear strategy essentially intact.
  
Nuclear Strategy under Kim Jong-un
From the new leader’s designation as “Supreme Leader” in December 2011 to the 
nuclear test of 12 February 2013, North Korea pursued the cyclical strategy with 
an emphasis on confrontation. Although signaling openness to engage in nego‑
tiations, Kim Jong‑un’s regime performed two ballistic missile tests, relentlessly 
criticized the South Korean administration of Lee Myung‑bak and the US, and 
performed a nuclear test. 
The return of the SPT remained blocked by Pyongyang’s unwillingness to recog‑
nize its responsibility in the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong‑do incidents – thus reject‑
ing the pre‑negotiation conditions. The goal of Kim Jong‑un seemed to be to win 
13  Especially the establishment of special economic zones (Rason, Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa 
islands), the creation of the Kaesong Industrial Park with South Korea, and the limited market 
liberalization of 2002.
14  For instance, in the New Year speech Kim Jong‑un urged North Koreans to “bring about a 
radical turn in the building of an economic giant” (Korean Central News Agency, 2013) The 
word radical is used several times and despite having an ambiguous sense it seems to indicate 
a slight shift from the status quo of economic centralization.
15  A group in which Ri can also be included. See McCurry (2012). 
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time to improve North Korean military capabilities and foster domestic support, 
besides trying to achieve a favorable grand bargain at bilateral level with the US. 
In fact, an agreement with the US was reached in February 2012, with North Korea 
declaring on the 29th that it would freeze nuclear tests, the enrichment of uranium, 
and the launching of long‑range missile, as well as allowing nuclear inspectors 
back into the country. In exchange Washington agreed to provide food aid (Reu‑
ters, 2012). This agreement was far from being a grand bargain, although it could 
be explored further by Pyongyang. Instead, North Koreans opted for confrontation 
and announced a satellite launch that made the agreement collapse (BBC, 2012). 
In April the satellite Kwangmyeongseong-3 was launched through the Unha-3, thus 
the perception that this was a disguised missile launch. Since it failed, confronta‑
tion was likely to continue because Pyongyang’s international position was weak‑
ened and only a successful confrontational action would compensate failure, as it 
happened in 2006 when the failed missile launch of July was compensated by the 
nuclear test of October. 
The following months were marked by an aggressive discourse against the South 
Korean administration of Lee and the US, in particular against the former – for 
instance, terms such as “rats” and “traitors” became very frequent. The politi‑
cal rhetoric against Lee and Washington was lashed practically on a daily basis 
through the media, such as the Korean Central News Agency or the Rodong Sin-
mun.16 Such attitude prevented the return of negotiations and signaled willing‑
ness to proceed with further provocations, especially when the last quarter of 
2012 would be marked by processes of leadership selection in the US, China, and 
South Korea, which Pyongyang sought to influence. To avoid isolation, North 
Korea opted for engagement with Russia17 and Japan.18  
The confrontation act came with the launch of the Unha-3/Unit 2 with the sate‑
llite Kwangmyeongseong-3/Unit 2 on 12 December 2012. Contrarily to the earlier 
launches, this one was successful and demonstrated North Korea’s evolution at 
the level of ballistic deployment systems. If Pyongyang becomes able to miniatu‑
rize a nuclear device into a ballistic missile using the tested technology, it can tar‑
get not only Northeast Asian countries but also the US. The negative reaction to 
16  For instance, see “Divine Punishment Awaits S. Korean Group of Traitors: KCNA Commen‑
tary”, 5 June 2012 and “US Accused of Intention to Keep Pro‑US Regime”, Rodong Sinmun, 29 
May 2012, on http://www.kcna.co.jp/index‑e.htm.
17  Besides maintaining military cooperation, North Korea and Russia are cooperating in the eco‑
nomic field. For instance, regarding North Korea’s debt of 11 billion dollars, Russia agreed to 
write off 90 percent of it and invest the other 10 percent in North Korea (Lulko, 2012).
18  The abduction of Japanese citizens was the focus of the meetings between Japan and North 
Korea (Daisuke, 2012). 
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that launch was unanimous, but the UNSC was prudent due to China’s position. 
The latter seemed particularly cautious due to the recent election of Xi Jinping as 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of China.
In the meantime, Kim Jong‑un made his surprise 2013 New Year speech in which 
a conciliatory tone was used in relation to South Korea, who had recently elected 
Park Geun‑hye as president in detriment of the liberal candidate, Moon Jae‑in. 
A conservative politician and the daughter of former dictator Park Chung‑hee, 
in principle Park Geun‑hye was not the preferred candidate of Pyongyang but 
notwithstanding Kim Jong‑un opted for that engaging act. It was a signal of en‑
gagement that sought to highlight North Korea’s willingness to negotiate from a 
position of force. However, that tone would change following the UNSC Reso‑
lution 2087 of January 2013,19 which condemned the launch of December 2012. 
China accepted the resolution and again demonstrated its willingness to impose 
limited punishments on North Korea. North Korea strongly criticized the resolu‑
tion, threatened its rivals, and vowed to proceed with a new nuclear test, which in 
fact would happen shortly afterwards. 
On 12 February 2013 North Korea performed its third nuclear test. As expected, 
it was condemn by the UNSC (Charbonneau, 2013). That nuclear test indicates a 
technological attempt by Pyongyang to miniaturize its nuclear weapons in order to 
fit ballistic missiles and raises international concerns about a shift from plutonium‑
based to uranium‑based devices. Regardless of the actual state of technological 
development, North Korea is signaling that at least it is on the verge of achieving 
that capability. Additionally, to strengthen its position, Pyongyang seemed to have 
informed Beijing that it is willing to conduct further nuclear tests and a missile 
launch during this year, hence signaling that negotiations are required in order to 
avoid that otherwise inevitable scenario (Lim, 2013).
In conclusion, Kim Jong‑un’s nuclear strategy remains basically the ones utilized 
by his father and grandfather. During the leadership of Kim Jong‑un, Pyongyang 
used that strategy with an emphasis on confrontation, culminating in its third 
nuclear test. The puzzle lies in explaining why Kim Jong‑un opted for such strat‑
egy when at domestic level he appeared to be a reformist who sought more open‑
ness. As I suggest in the following section, the choice for keeping the strategy 
of engagement‑confrontation is explained by the continuing international con‑
straints on North Korea and by the domestic constraints faced by the new leader.
 
19  The UNSC Resolution 2087 was approved on 22 January 2013: http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2013/sc10891.doc.htm.
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International and Domestic Constraints
Internationally, North Korea’s position remained mostly unaltered since Kim 
Jong‑il passed away. The country was still surrounded by powerful foes, since 
the relative positions of North Korea, South Korea and the US in the structures 
of military and economic power have remained basically unaltered. Thus, 
Pyongyang was still incomparably weaker than Washington and Seoul. Moreo‑
ver, Pyongyang remained dependent of an ally that was not strong enough to 
guarantee the regime’s survival and remained displeased about its nuclear po‑
licy, as illustrated by the summoning of the North Korean ambassador in China 
– Ji Jae‑ryong – by the Chinese Foreign Minister – Yang Jiechi – after the last nu‑
clear test (Fox News, 2013). As Kim Il‑sung and Kim Jong‑il did before him, Kim 
Jong‑un and his entourage were aware that under such negative international 
conditions the best tool to promote regime survival was the nuclear program, 
despite its international costs regarding isolation and scolding by its ally. 
As if those structural conditions were not sufficient enough to keep unaltered 
the nuclear strategy of North Korea, there were three political shifts in 2012 
that damaged Pyongyang’s interests: South Korea increased the range of its 
ballistic missiles; North Korea’s economic dependence of China increased; and 
Japan has recently re‑elected Shinzo Abe as Prime‑Minister.  Regarding the first 
alteration, South Korea was able to negotiate with Washington an increase of 
the range of its missiles. From the previously allowed range of 300 km Seoul 
can now deploy missiles that reach 800 km, which allows it to hit any target 
in North Korean territory. Although Washington prefers to control the mili‑
tary capabilities of its ally, it acknowledged that the recent behavior of North 
Korea justified the strengthening of Seoul’s autonomous military capabilities. 
As for the second alteration, it was reported that trade volume between China 
is likely to have increased in 2012, surpassing the already amazing growth of 
2011 and perhaps increasing China’s share of 70 percent in Pyongyang’s foreign 
trade (Demick, 2012). This indicates that Chinese leverage over Pyongyang will 
likely increase a bit. Lastly, Shinzo Abe returned to power in Japan. With the 
previous government led by Yoshihiko Noda, Pyongyang was actually able to 
improve North Korean‑Japanese relations during 2012, as mentioned above. 
However, with the election of a conservative prime‑minister whose govern‑
ment includes members that support revisionist foreign policy shifts – which 
in practice may eventually lead to a military build‑up in Japan – the relations 
with Tokyo will likely turn sour again. Hence, in theory North Korea’s strategic 
position was damaged by such election, even if a Japanese threat remains more 
of a narrative than a foreseeable reality.
Despite the harsh international conditions, one could suggest that North Korea 
could have accepted Washington’s agreement and defected later on as soon as it 
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obtained economic benefits or it became evident that Pyongyang would get none 
if major concessions were not made. Prematurely rejecting such agreement by 
launching a missile could be explained in two senses: Pyongyang felt that its nego‑
tiation position was not strong enough or Kim Jong‑un domestically profited from 
confrontation. I suggest that even if the negotiation position was in fact improved 
by a provocation, Kim Jong‑un’s decision to confront the US was strongly affected 
by domestic constraints.  
Besides the international factors obstacles to regime survival, the new leader also 
had to deal with domestic factors that damaged his probabilities of remaining in 
office. As previously noted, the selection of Kim Jong‑un as leader encompassed 
risks of contestation – especially due to his age and lack of political experience. 
Even if contenders did not show up for the game of Kim Jong‑il’s succession, it did 
not mean that a conspiracy was not occurring. The fact that a young and inexperi‑
enced leader made decisions that started to shake the political and economic esta‑ 
blishment has likely promoted dissatisfaction among members of the elite. Since 
the increase in the quantity and quality of discontent members of the elite can 
make the domestic balance of power swing in favor of an alternative leader, Kim 
Jong‑un was required to take protective measures.
At domestic level Kim Jong‑un could control dissatisfaction by gathering popular 
support through a pleasing public image, purging members of the elite that op‑
pose his measures, or conducting surgical economic reforms that not only reduce 
dependency on foreign aid but also increase the leader’s ability to distribute goods 
among subsets in the population that are fundamental to keep him in power. 
Alongside those domestic actions, Kim Jong‑un could also use international con‑
frontation as a political tool to remain in power, by shaping how elites and masses 
perceive him.  
In relation to the elites, a confrontational posture would boost his credentials 
among them, especially the military. To boost his credentials means exploring posi‑
tive and negative reactions: on the positive side it means being admired as a leader, 
consequently decreasing the perception that his age and inexperience would lead 
to mistakes that threaten the regime; on the negative side, by challenging giants 
such as the US and China, Kim Jong‑un signals that he is able to tenaciously fight 
potential contenders – thus leading the latter to review their expected utility of 
challenging the young Kim. 
As for the masses, international confrontation would increase Kim Jong‑un’s 
control over the general public. Since an act of international confrontation is ge‑
nerally accompanied by legitimating rhetoric, it can be used to fuel the sense of 
insecurity of masses in relation to actual or fabricated threats to their security. In 
the case of Pyongyang that tactic has been widely used in order to continue jus‑
tifying its anachronistic regime, hence perpetuating the existence of the ideologi‑
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cal divide that keeps the Korean nation separated. By fomenting fear of and hate 
against the US and South Korea, Kim Jong‑un is likely to have the masses ral‑
lying around him, supporting the nation’s savior against an imminent external 
danger. Besides strengthening his allure in times of crisis, through international 
confrontation Kim Jong‑un can also justify his failure to fulfill the regime’s prom‑
ise of turning North Korea into a “strong and prosperous nation” by 2012. As a 
result, North Korean masses forget or excuse the failures of public policy and 
become less inclined to protest. Moreover, in times of crisis the domestic security 
apparatus has legitimacy to increase the suppression of general population in 
order to prevent potential protests.  
Given that domestic setting, Kim Jong‑un’s emphasis on confrontation is a rational 
choice. Through missile and nuclear tests, as well as aggressive discourse towards 
South Korea and the US, Kim Jong‑un was able not only to strengthen the inter‑
national position of North Korea but also to strengthen his leadership. Those do‑
mestic incentives seemed so strong that even when engagement could bring some 
advantages, Kim Jong‑un opted for confrontation. This was illustrated by North 
Korea’s eschewing of the agreement with Washington by launching the satellite in 
April 2012, especially because that month marked the centennial commemoration 
of the birth of Kim Il‑sung. This was the perfect opportunity for the young lead‑
er to demonstrate that his similarities with his “great” grandfather went beyond 
physical appearances. 
Conclusion
In sum, leadership change from Kim Jong‑il to Kim Jong‑un did not alter the 
foundations of North Korea’s nuclear strategy, which is still based upon a cycli‑
cal use of actions of engagement and confrontation that ultimately seek to pre‑
vent denuclearization. Although leadership change brought some political shifts 
or signs of them at the level of public image, the Songun policy, and economic 
reform, the nuclear strategy inherited from his father remained basically intact. 
International and domestic conditions have constrained Kim Jong‑un to follow 
that strategy and to emphasize confrontation through an aggressive discourse 
against South Korea and the US, missile launches, and a nuclear test. In order 
to assure regime survival and to remain in power, Kim Jong‑un’s optimal choice 
was to thoroughly implement the nuclear strategy initiated by Kim Il‑sung and 
consolidated by Kim Jong‑il. 
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Resumo 
As Tradições e Opções Estratégicas da Índia no 
Sistema de Segurança do Indo-Pacífico 
Perante um complexo de segurança Ásia‑Pacífico 
que se encontra em expansão para a região mais 
ampla do Indo‑Pacífico, a Índia é forçada a adap‑
tar‑se e redefinir as suas prioridades estratégicas. 
Este artigo apresenta os novos desafios que o país 
enfrenta nesta nova Ásia, bem como o grande de‑
bate indiano sobre a futura postura estratégica do 
país, incluindo a sua ambição em garantir autono‑
mia estratégica. São desenvolvidos quatro cenários 
possíveis: continuada aproximação aos Estados 
Unidos de forma a contrabalançar a China; criação 
de uma aliança ou eixo de segurança de estados 
asiáticos visando a contenção da China; estabele‑
cimento conjunto com a China de um regime de 
segurança continental baseado num“G‑2 asiático” 
ou “Panchsheel 2.0” que exclua os Estados Unidos; 
ou uma postura isolacionista e introvertida focada 
em desenvolver capacidades domésticas e assim 
evitar o envolvimento do país em espirais de com‑
petição e insegurança internacional.
Abstract 
As the Asia-Pacific security complex expands and 
morphs into a larger Indo-Pacific system, India will 
need to adapt and redefine its strategy. This article sets 
out the new challenges India faces in this new Asia, and 
then proceeds to review the great Indian debate about 
its strategic culture and perennial quest for autonomy. 
It evaluates four possible strategic postures for India to 
choose from: further rapprochement with the United 
States to balance China; initiating a pan-Asian security 
framework to contain China; joint establishment with 
China of an “Asian G-2” or “Panchsheel 2.0” security 
regime that excludes the United States; and an isola-
tionist, introvert focus on domestic “soft balancing” 
by avoiding entanglement in security and competitive 
power politics.
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Whether because of China’s rise or the American oriental “pivot” or “rebalan‑
cing” act, Asia is once again being proclaimed as the new “global geopolitical 
center”. This is all about a “new Asian century.” CNN’s Fareed Zakaria (2008) 
speaks about a “post‑American world” due to the “rise of the rest” and Singapo‑
rean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani (2008) about the “new Asian Hemisphere” as 
the natural outcome of an “irresistible shift of global power to the East”. It’s as if 
the whole world was suddenly tilting.
This “brouhaha” about a new Asia, and the impeding collapse of the West dates 
back to at least the Ancient Greeks and their anxiety about the “oriental” barba‑
rians. In regard to modern times, in his recent book on key Asian leaders in the late 
19th and early 20th century, including India’s Rabindranath Tagore, Pankaj Mishra 
(2012) reminds us that the idea of a “new Asia” has been around for at least a cen‑
tury – starting with Imperial Japan’s victory over “Western” Russia in, a key event 
he sees as determinant in inspiring a new generation of Asian nationalist leaders. 
One of them, Jawaharlal Nehru, thus referred to the rise of Asia as early as 1935. In 
his presidential address of the National Congress, at Lahore, in that year, he noted 
that “Asia, and even India, will play a determining part in the future of world pol‑
icy. The brief day of European domination is already approaching its end. Europe 
has ceased to be the centre of activity and interest.” (Nehru, 1936: 15)
Whether radically new or not, there is little doubt that Asia today is more than just 
old wine in new bottles. The continent has indeed undergone dramatic economic, 
social and political transformations in recent decades. One good example is that 
of South Korea whose developmental standards in the 1950s, still ravaged by the 
impact of war, were equivalent to those of India and Ghana. Today it is one of the 
most advanced economies f the world, ranking 15th in terms of the Human De‑
velopment Index (India 134th, Ghana 135th), and 29th in terms of per capita income 
based on purchasing power parity (India 126th, Ghana 148th).
The “developmental” state‑driven model of economy growth, often with authori‑
tarian undertones, propelled the so‑called Asian tigers to the forefront of global 
growth, productivity and innovation. Southeast Asia witnessed the emergence of 
ASEAN and an advanced level of new regional institutionalism and economic co‑
operation based on liberal trade and investment regimes. Most importantly, how‑
ever, were the economic reforms of China (1978) and India (1991), which opened 
up immense markets and initiated two of Humanity’s largest and fastest socio‑
economic transformations.
These changes have naturally constrained the foreign policies and strategic pos‑
tures of China and India. For example, both countries remain acutely dependent 
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on foreign energy resources, the global free trade regime, and on the economic 
growth and demand of consumer markets in the United States. Both countries 
also have several million‑strong diasporas, with many overseas citizen spread 
around the world. 
At the same time, in terms of relative power, most analysts agree that America’s is 
now beyond its maximum peak, having begun a slow, steady decline. The United 
States continue to as the uncontested global hegemon, a preponderant power that 
President Obama likes to call an “indispensable nation” with immense absolute 
advantages over the military, economic and technological capabilities of its im‑
mediate followers. One must also not forget that it has been able to reinvent itself 
before. 
The relative gap, however, is narrowing. The current debate on what “limited” 
role the United States should assume in managing the global order, and Presi‑
dent Obama’s focus on the “nation‑building at home” narrative, signal the current 
mood – Washington wants to figure out how to save on managerial costs without 
reducing its relative power. This is the new “frugal superpower”, in the current 
words of Michael Mandelbaum (2010), who only in the mid‑2000s had called the 
United States a “reluctant Goliath” without which the global order would collapse 
(Mandelbaum, 2005). What is less clear, however, is whether or how these chan‑
ging circumstances in the United States and globally may shape the strategic pos‑
tures and options for China and India in Asia. 
This article argues that based on these innumerous new challenges and circum‑
stances, India faces a menu of four different strategic postures in the new Asia‑Pa‑
cific security complex, now also referred to as Indo‑Pacific. It starts by setting out 
the new challenges India faces in this new Asia, and then proceeds to review the 
great Indian debate about its strategic culture and perennial quest for autonomy. 
A final section lists the four possible postures: further rapprochement with the 
United States to balance China; initiating a pan‑Asian security framework to con‑
tain China; joint establishment with China of an “Asian G‑2” or “Panchsheel 2.0” 
security regime that excludes the United States; and an isolationist, introvert focus 
on domestic “soft balancing” by avoiding entanglement in security and competi‑
tive power politics.
The New Asia
Asia has witnessed four main transformations at the strategic level that are of di‑
rect concern to India. This is – at least in India’s perspective – a new Asia indeed.
First, the rise and increasing assertiveness of a self‑reliant China. India’s rivalry 
with China is not a new factor per se. The Sino‑Indian border has been object of 
a protracted border dispute, which led to a war in 1962 and repeated military 
skirmishes since then. India also hosts the Dalai Lama and his separatist Tibetan 
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government‑in‑exile. What did change is the relative balance, with a China that 
has progressed dramatically on the military front and, unlike in the past, is no 
longer dependent on external security support from the Soviet Union or the Uni‑
ted States. This Chinese self‑reliance is linked to a new Chinese assertiveness, in 
unprecedented terms and scale, most recently in the South China Sea. 
The big debate is on whether this assertiveness is a new behavior (or just more 
visible and capable than before) and its underlying causes. Is it domestic nation‑
alism, political party and elite competition, changing civil‑military dynamics, or 
merely the perception of a strategic window of opportunity to gain advantage and 
consolidate territorial gains? Or, at the external level, is China’s assertiveness mo‑
tivated by a mounting sense of insecurity, perception of encirclement, containment 
and isolation induced by the “American pivot”? 
These are important questions because different explanations will necessa‑ 
rily lead to different policy recommendations. This exercise is thus an elementary 
task for India, which is paradoxically locked in both in increasing competition and 
cooperation with China. China is now India’s largest trade partner, with a total 
volume of US$75 billion – mostly Indian imports that have led to a tremendous 
deficit. If one adds to this trade asymmetry the logic of historical rivalry and com‑
petition (war and border conflict), a variety of domestic factors (nationalism, eco‑
nomic protectionism), as well as the reality of increasing inter‑dependence and 
cooperation, one can see why this will not only be one of the most complex, but 
also most crucial relations for 21st century geopolitics.
Second, India now also faces an increasingly assertive presence of the United 
States in Asia. Unlike what is often suggested, the United States has been a resi‑
dent Asian power since at least the Second World War, if not even earlier, since 
its Philippine war (1899‑1902). However, its post‑War strategic “hub‑and‑spoke” 
system of Asian alliances with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and 
Thailand, was always one that focused on East and Southeast Asia, or broadly the 
region known as Asia‑Pacific. 
Excluded from the American system of regional alliances, India was therefore al‑
ways the “least Asian” actor in the embryonic pan‑Asian security system, and a 
mere observer in terms of the East and Southeast Asian sub‑systems. While its mil‑
itary forces were sent for peacekeeping missions to Africa (since the Congo crisis in 
the early 1960s), New Delhi abstained from armed intervention in the Korea war, 
and kept a safe diplomatic distance from the Vietnam crisis. There were certainly 
important cultural, historical ties to Southeast Asia, from where the Indian Na‑
tional Army had fought on the Japanese side against the British. Jawaharlal Nehru 
was a regular presence in the region, culminating with his presence at the Bandung 
conference, in 1955. But in economic and military terms, and unlike China, India 
was largely absent from East and Southeast Asia. 
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All this has now changed, as India “asianizes” its economic and security pro‑
files. This integration (or reintegration) of the South Asian regional security 
sub‑system into the larger Asian one underlies the larger transformation of 
Asia‑Pacific system into what is now called “the Indo‑Pacific”, as forwarded by 
some Australian analysts seeking to underline the new geostrategic centrality 
of their country (Medcalf, 2012). As the United States reconsiders and strength‑
ens its role in Asia, we thus have, for the first time, a truly integrated security 
system spanning two oceans, from the East African coast to the Western coast 
of the United States. This naturally poses major challenges to Indian strategic 
thinking, forcing it to reconsider its traditionally continentally introversion to‑
wards Pakistan and the Himalayan border with China, to a much wider and 
oceanic Southern horizon. In the words of India’s ambassador to Washington, 
Nirupama Rao (2013):
“The earlier concept of the Asia‑Pacific had sought to exclude India – today the 
term Indo‑Pacific encompasses the subcontinent as an integral part of this east‑
ern world. We are glad that the mental map of the Asia Pacific has changed and 
that the center of gravity has moved westward to include India.” 
This reorientation is reflected in India’s major investments in its naval capabili‑
ties, traditionally neglected in previous decades. The shifting of its Western Na‑
val Command from Mumbai southwards to Karwar, just South of Goa, signals 
this new Southward focus. There are several other initiatives India has taken 
to reinforce this strategic reorientation in order to pursue immediate econom‑
ic interests, strengthen its naval footprint, and also respond to the increasing 
centrality and importance of the Indian Ocean within the larger Indo‑Pacific 
security system. 
New Delhi thus initiated a regular Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2008 (South 
Africa hosted the 2012 edition), revived the multilateral Indian Ocean Rim‑Associ‑
ation for Regional Cooperation (IOR‑ARC), and has played a leading role in com‑
bating piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. At the same time, its Navy 
has strengthened outreach program to its counterparts in the smaller countries of 
the region – from joint exercises, to setting up listening posts, donating vessels and 
equipment etc.
A third factor in this new Asia that affects India relates to the increasing levels of 
interdependence. As previously highlighted in the case of China, India now has 
reached unprecedented volumes and shares of intra‑regional Asian trade and in‑
vestments. Its “Look East” policy initiated in 1992 has been pursued steadily, espe‑
cially towards Southeast Asia. India’s profile in the rest of Asia has thus improved 
dramatically, as smaller countries increasingly look up to India to balance Chinese 
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power. India has often been unable or incapable to respond to such expectations, 
which is often rooted in its reluctance to play such a game and possibly becoming 
entangled in a spiraling competition logic with Beijing. 
Paradoxically, the mantra of non‑alignment, despite never having really been fol‑
lowed in the past, has now turned into a paradigmatic straightjacket that domesti‑
cally constrains Indian diplomacy. The fact remains, however, that India has dra‑
matically expanded its presence in the rest of Asia: it has increased the number 
of joint naval exercises with Japan, Thailand, Indonesia and other Asian navies, 
it holds an unprecedented number of high‑level and strategic partnerships, and 
– most importantly – has shown great interest in joining a number of multilateral 
and regional frameworks, both as a participant, dialogue partner or observer (in‑
cluding ASEAN and the East Asia Summit).
Finally, one must also acknowledge the proliferation of democratic regimes in Asia 
since the end of the Cold War. A few decades ago, India was still an outlier, an 
exceptional case of democratic success and longevity in a continent marred by a 
variety of military and civilian authoritarianism, from Zia ul‑Haq’s Pakistan to 
Suharto’s Indonesia and Park Chung‑hee’s South Korea. Today, while India re‑
mains exceptional in its democratic longevity, it is no longer alone because Asia is 
at the forefront of what Samuel Huntington would have possibly called the fourth 
democratic wave. 
As Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines and South Korea are now all experiencing 
unprecedented levels of political freedom, and even Myanmar and Singapore are 
experimenting with democratization, it is China that is seen as the extraordinary 
outlier. The “Beijing model” and popularity of the so‑called “Asian authoritarian 
capitalism” remain strong, but are suffering unprecedented scrutiny and opposi‑
tion. In this scenario, the normative agenda of “values” is making a comeback 
and contesting the assumption that economic growth and social order can be sus‑
tained, in the long term, in an authoritarian, closed and military – or party‑led 
political system. 
At first sight, this may seem more of an advantage, than a challenge for India. 
After all, in a world increasingly dominated by democracies, one would naturally 
assume that India would reap reputational benefits, often also called “soft power”. 
The challenge, however, resides in India overcoming its traditional reluctance to 
brand and promote itself as a democracy and adopt this as a factor in its external 
relations. As with the United States in the beginning of the 20th century, India will 
need to settle on what “normative” identity it wishes to play. The default option, 
still very popular, is to keep a safe distance from this rhetoric, especially after the 
“American neo‑con” disaster of militarized democracy promotion. This Indian iso‑
lationist stance is often associated with a “prudent” realist India, a democratic city 
on the hill that refuses to impose its democratic regime as an “advantage” and a 
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“model”. The consequent dilemma is defined thus in the report Non-Alignment 2.0: 
A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century: 
“In many ways the paradox is that precisely at the moment nations become 
powerful, they are vulnerable to being blindsided by their own ambition. Pre‑
cisely at the moment they have an ability to shape the world, they shape it ac‑
cording to imperatives of power. India must remain true to its aspiration of cre‑
ating a new and alternative universality.” (Khilnani et al., 2012: 69) 
This leads us to the issue of India’s strategic culture, the core tenets of its world‑
view and its external posture. 
Strategy and Culture
Debates about strategic culture are necessarily at the intersection of the material 
(security) and ideational (culture) – this is obvious in the very nature of each of the 
two composing words: “strategy” reflecting a rather objective and planned nature, 
and “culture” a flexible, contingent and mutable one. 
The same may be said about Indian strategic culture, in particular: it is impos‑
sible to distinguish and segment ideational and material drivers in Indian stra‑
tegic thought. Scholars have tried to privilege one over the other. Instead, a more 
productive approach may be to look at them as mutually constitutive, ideas and 
imperatives both continuously shaping and replacing each other as the main driv‑
er. From this perspective, India has always been hospitable to a very cautious, 
prudent and realist tradition of strategic thinking. Except for pure chance, which 
is unlikely, how else could have its diplomacy managed to keep India relatively 
secure in a region plagued by hostile nuclear‑armed rivals (Pakistan and China: 
five wars), a variety of insurgencies and separatist movements (from Kashmir, to 
the Naxalites and the Northeast), and many other transnational threats (Islamic 
terrorism, in particular)? 
These many challenges and the constant task of “putting off fires” may have not 
allowed for the emergence of an institutionalized, consensual and integrated stra‑
tegic framework. That does not mean, however, that there is no Indian strategic 
tradition. The debate on this question is intense and has important repercussions 
on how India will operate in the new Asia.
A first approach to the nature of India’s strategic culture can be found in a popular 
report prepared by George Tanham (1992) for the RAND Corporation just after the 
end of the Cold War, in 1992. His assessment is unambiguous: India lacks a strate‑
gic mindset. He identifies four factors of deep continuity (“determinants”) in Indi‑
an strategic thinking, all of which either geographic, historical, and cultural: South 
Asia as an isolated geographic entity and thus regional straightjacket responsible 
for Indian strategic introversion; a deep historical influence of a weak central state 
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authority, with a continuous cycle of integration and fragmentation of imperial 
powers; the lack of rigid and institutionalized strategic thinking as a reflection 
of Indian society’s diversity and constant necessity of peaceful accommodation, 
assimilation and adaption; and the historical influence of British colonial rule of 
creating buffer states and achieve sea denial capacity to protect India’s regional 
preponderance. He thus concludes that Indian strategic thinking is “inchoate and 
ad hoc (reactive) rather than precise and systematic.”
His 1996 rejoinder is even more explicit: “Indians continue to be relatively neglect‑
ful of security issues and to have no institutionalized method of appraising threats 
and fashioning strategic responses” (Tanham et al., 1996: 19). This understanding 
has dominated Indian official, policy and public thinking since then, reflected in 
the popular idea that India is still in “search for a foreign policy” and lacks the 
capacity to develop a “grand strategy” (Pant, 2009). It thus remains a “soft state” 
and easy prey in the supposedly nasty and Hobbesian arena of world politics, par‑
ticularly vulnerable to the idea of a formidable, authoritarian and rational China.
Other approaches are less categorical and argue that what analysts see as a “lack” 
of strategic thinking is actually the outcome of a variety of historical, cultural, 
contextual and institutional factors, as well as a conscious decision to minimize 
the role of force in foreign policy. For example, in Arming without Aiming, Cohen 
and Dasgupta (2012), explore how despite unprecedented access to wealth and 
resources after embracing economic reforms in the 1990s, the Indian state has been 
unable to craft a coherent strategy to efficiently use its military assets and thus 
improve its strategic position vis‑à‑vis Pakistan and China. 
They argue that this is the result of a deeply embedded doctrine of “strategic 
restraint” based on four historical factors: the perceived benign nature of the in‑
ternational context and success in diffusing threats diplomatically; a budgetary 
bias privileging developmental concerns over defence and security concerns; an 
ideological aversion to using the military as an instrument of state policy; and a 
conscious attempt to reassure rivals by maintain a non‑threatening profile and 
thus avoiding the security dilemma. The doctrine of strategic restraint, a policy 
they thus describe as “not without wisdom,” and India’s consequent peculiar 
civil‑military and defense dysfunctionalities are thus attributed to mix of con‑
scious and strategic choices, and cultural and historical factors. At the same time, 
however, Cohen and Dasgupta (2012: 146) question the sustainability of the doc‑
trine given new challenges and threats, and note that “Indian policy, like Japan’s, 
is reactive, not strategic.”  
There is also an important evolutionary approach, which presents post‑independ‑
ence Indian leadership as having been excessively idealistic, naïve and even uto‑
pian, taking unwarranted inspiration in the success of its non‑violent freedom 
struggle. This approach presents India, and in particular Nehru, as a naïve post‑
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colonial actor initially drawn onto a dangerously utopian foreign policy path only 
to be progressively socialized (and punished, as in 1962) into the hard reality of 
Westphalian power politics. From this angle, India’s foreign policy and strategic 
limitations of today are ossified remains of that post‑1947 past. 
This line of inquiry has most notably been developed by Sumit Ganguly (2003) 
and his quasi‑biological narrative of an Indian foreign policy that “finally grows 
up” after the end of the Cold War. His three‑staged evolutionary periodization 
informs also the scholarship of several others (e.g. Mukherjee and Malone, 2011). 
While C. Raja Mohan (2003: 261, 268) does recognize that Nehru had crafted a 
careful balance between idealism and realism, he does reflect the evolutionary 
approach by describing India’s fundamental transformation during the 1990s from 
a “reactive power” that he metaphorically describes as a “vegetarian, slow‑footed 
and prickly porcupine” to a “normal power” he describes as a “tiger”. For Mo‑
han (2003: 266), this is because the “centre of gravity of Indian foreign policy (…) 
shifted from idealism to realism in the 1990s.” 
A recent critique of this evolutionary school of thought is presented by Srinath 
Raghavan (2010: 14), who presents Nehru as a statesman “far more adroit and 
pragmatic than the naïf and idealist of retrospective detraction, (…) at the junc‑
ture of liberal and realist traditions.” This is also the reasoning of Pratap B. Me‑
hta (2011: 208), for whom this Nehruvian legacy has ever since offered a line 
of continuity to Indian foreign policy, whose driving “mindset” he describes as 
“cautious prudence”.
Given these rather gloomy narratives and approaches to studying Indian foreign 
policy, security policies and strategic posture, it is therefore not surprising that, in 
recent years, India’s academic and policy focus has been to “correct” the suppos‑
edly “lack of” or “limitations” in Indian strategic thinking and policy‑making. The 
term “grand strategy” has proliferated into a variety of research projects, think 
tank reports, scholarly articles and books, and doctoral dissertations – some of 
which candidly acknowledging that they ambition to “invent” a “grand strategy” 
for the country’s future. 
Such exercises are often funded by government agencies and have initiated a 
large‑scale, often also public debate on the country’s strategic priorities, from its 
policy towards climate change, trade negotiation or relations with other major 
powers (Khilnani et al., 2012; Sikri, 2009; Krishnappa et al., 2012; for a good over‑
view, see Schaffer, 2010). A key debate has been the role of the military and the 
objectives of series of required defence and security reforms – from procurement 
and production policies (Mukherjee, 2011) up to force allocation and projection 
along its borders and even abroad, beyond the region (Ladwig III, 2010).
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The Quest for Autonomy
One of the most frequently cited concepts in these debates is the phrase “strategic 
autonomy,” which also forms the core of the much‑debated semi‑governmental 
report Non-Alignment 2.0 cited above. This revival of non‑alignment as a strategy 
to achieve India’s perennial core interest of “strategic autonomy” in New Delhi is 
puzzling, given that non‑alignment (and associated principles such as non‑inter‑
ference) was, for sure, a core rhetorical concept, but only rarely implemented India 
during the Cold War. Four examples illustrate such discrepancies between the idea 
and the practice of non‑alignment. 
First, India’s nuclear program, which slowly developed in the civil energy realm 
but eventually, especially after the 1970s and the 1974 test, transformed into an 
active military program. The 34 long years between the 1964 Chinese tests at 
Loop Nor and India’s Pokhran 2 tests in May 1998 reflect the immense dilemma 
India faced between its stated commitment to disarmament, denuclearization, 
non‑proliferation, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the exigencies of a 
rising China, an uncertain nuclear program in Pakistan and a tightening inter‑
national legal framework on non‑proliferation, testing and supply guarantees.   
A second example is that of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, in 1979, which 
Indira Gandhi supported implicitly. While in stark violation of its principle of 
non‑interventionism and a blatant instance of use of force against a non‑aligned 
nation, New Delhi succumbed to the potential benefits of a friendly Afghanistan 
to gain further strategic depth over Pakistan and thus further consolidate its au‑
tonomy. Similar concerns stimulated three other examples of active Indian military 
interventionism in the region: East Pakistan in 1971; Sri Lanka in 1987‑90; and 
Operation Cactus in the Maldives, in 1988. 
The objectives was always to secure India’s regional hegemony and, at the same 
time, diffuse any opportunity for outside intervention by an extra‑regional power, 
a major concern highlighted by Howard Schaffer in his work on the limits to Amer‑
ican influence in Kashmir, and South Asia in general. This is conventionally also 
referred to as the “Indira doctrine,” in reference to a set of principles she asserted 
to signal India’s opposition to any outside interference in a region she wished to 
claim as Delhi’s strategic backyard (Hagerty, 1991).
The terms of this debate changed dramatically after 1991: strategic autonomy re‑
mained as a central concern, but now in a different form. Was it possible to remain 
“negatively” autonomous, i.e. isolated from an increasing interdependent global 
economy? Could the objective (or myth) of self‑reliance, in the economic or de‑
fense realms, still be sustained by a country that today imports more than 70% of 
its total energy requirements, and 90% of its oil through sea lanes? 
In this new post‑Cold War era, autonomy could now be ensured in two ways: 
by shedding the ideational and moral baggage of the Cold War, which obviously 
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offered severe limitations to dealing with authoritarian and resource‑rich states 
like Myanmar or Sudan; or by diversifying the basket of economic and security 
partners, thus reducing the risk of depending on solely one provider, like during 
the Cold War. The latter is clearly winning; an approach referred to as strategic 
diversification, or “omni‑alignment”. 
India’s great strategic debate is far from settled, however. Three examples 
illustrate this. First, as highlighted in David Malone’s recent work (2011), India has 
started to discuss its possible more positive and proactive role in global govern‑
ance. Thus, instead of only throwing its weight around, can India play the role 
of what Robert Zoellick referred to as “responsible stakeholder” in international 
institutions and in the regulation of public, global common goods, such as the free 
trade regime or freedom of the sea lines of communication, from the straits of Or‑
muz to Malacca? The areas of global trade (the Doha round), climate change, and 
liberal interventionism (responsibility to protect) assume particular significance in 
this regard. While India is still reluctant to play a proactive role in any of these, the 
very fact that a debate has been initiated about these issues in India is an indicator 
of how the definition of strategic autonomy is bound to change.
Second, in relation to the security complex of Afghanistan and Pakistan, can India 
keep its strategic autonomy without first establishing its regional hegemony in 
practice and, necessarily, normalizing its relations with Pakistan? To what extent 
can the latent Indo‑Pakistani battlefront in Afghanistan be pacified, allowing India 
to shift important resources to other regional fronts, with China, and beyond South 
Asia? Most importantly, settling the continental fronts with Pakistan (Afghanistan) 
and China would allow India to strengthen its Southward, oceanic profile. This 
has already led to massive investments in the Indian Navy, and a rediscovery of 
their classical strategists on the Indian Ocean (Pannikar, 1945). This is therefore an 
example of how economic opening and external material dependence have 
changed not only the substantive definition of strategic autonomy, but also the 
procedural mechanisms through which India seeks to achieve it.
A third example of this redefinition resides in India’s policy towards China. Here, 
structural readings of international relations come in handy again: with a rising 
China across the Himalayas, and the 1990s myth of a strategic tripolar Russia‑
China‑India alliance dismissed, India has unambiguously moved closer to the 
United States. One indicator can be found in the hardest realm of all in interna‑
tional politics: defense acquisitions – in the last five years alone, India imported 
as much American armament as it had in the previous 25 years altogether. This is 
why the nuclear cooperation deal with the United States, negotiated between 2005 
and 2005, led to such unprecedented levels of political conflict and fragmentation 
in the Indian strategic community: to what extent is the quest for strategic auto‑
nomy endangered by such a rapprochement? Will Delhi now be an American “ju‑
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nior partner,” increasingly dependent on Washington? Can the Chinese “threat” 
be dealt with without such a tilt? These are questions that continue to animate the 
great Indian strategic debate. 
India’s Strategic Autonomy in the New Asia: Four Options
Given India’s strategic traditions, the current debate, and the complexities of the 
new Asia‑Pacific security system, what possible postures can one assume New 
Delhi to adopt in future? Its strategic menu offers a choice of four different op‑
tions.
One option is to counter‑balance China through even tighter rapprochement 
with the United States. From a structural point of view, this is already ongoing. 
Compared to the relative hostility in US‑India relations until the late 1980s, the 
post‑Cold War has been one of gradual thawing of the relations, culminating in 
unprecedented levels of military and intelligence cooperation, including joint 
exercises, as well as a series of new strategic dialogues and agreements, from 
agriculture to education, science and technology. The 2005‑08 negotiations for 
a bilateral civil nuclear energy agreement eventually led the United States to 
recognize India’s nuclear status, de facto and de jure, outside the non‑prolif‑
eration regime. Never before have India and the United States been so close. 
Their shared democratic values, now so often invoked, certainly play a role in 
facilitating this rapprochement, but the rise of China is certainly the main driver. 
While this allows India to enjoy some degree of protection under the American 
security umbrella in Asia, it also exposes it to the risk of further alienating China. 
India would also never be an equal partner in a possible Indo‑American alliance, 
which would also perpetually expose it to risk of ending up in the worst of all 
scenarios: abandoned by the United States, and exposed to a belligerent, insecure 
and rancorous China.
A second option is to go alone and play hardball with China, seeking to contain it 
by working out an alliance of like‑minded Asian powers. This would put India in 
the leading role, actively seeking out to construct a security axis of regional pow‑
ers and other smaller states that share its anxiety about China’s uncertain future 
posture. Japan assumes a strategic importance in this context – Tokyo may not be 
as reluctant to be a junior partner to the United States, but it shares the same Indian 
concerns about being abandoned by a declining America. Even if Washington does 
not oppose such an initiative, it would still face two major obstacles. First: the classic 
security dilemma. Such an autonomous pan‑Asian alliance to contain China, even 
if thought of as being a last resort defensive mechanism against a possibly aggres‑
sive China (territorial expansion, military coercion by missiles, air and sea power, 
blocking sea lines of communication, increasing cyber attacks) plays the risk of being 
interpreted by Beijing as an offensive maneuver to isolate it. Second, it also faces a 
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collective action problem: who will take the leadership in crafting, coordinating and 
implementing such a security mechanism? All these states may be anxious about 
China, but they are, at the same time, also increasingly dependent on it in terms of 
trade and investments for sustained economic growth. Under these circumstances, 
it is difficult to imagine who, if not India, would take upon such a responsibility and 
consequent exposure to Beijing’s probable wrathful response.
A third, softer alternative, of liberal‑institutionalist inspiration, focuses on the 
possibility of India taking the initiative to craft a pan‑Asian multilateral security 
framework, as Europe crafted with the Helsinki Accords of 1975. Rather than a 
global Sino‑American “G2”, this would be an Asian Sino‑Indian G2, lead jointly by 
both China and India. Such a fundamental step would constitute a new coopera‑
tive security order and settle the deep mistrust prevailing between several states 
in the region: if India and China can agree on setting up such an order, one cannot 
imagine why other Asian states would shy away from it. Northeast and Southeast 
Asia have experimented with their own mini‑lateral security frameworks, but the 
time may now have come to integrate them into a wider “Asian security regime,” 
maybe based on a revised version of the 1954 Sino‑Indian Panchsheel Treaty, based 
on the five principles of mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, non‑aggression, non‑interference in each other’s internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co‑existence. 
It is questionable whether China, at least from its current advantageous stand‑
point, would acquiesce to such a “Panchsheel 2.0” agreement and thus give up 
what it may perceive as its absolute and relative security advantage over all oth‑
er Asian states, India included. But it does address growing Chinese concerns to 
find a way to legitimize its disproportionate role and assuage anxieties among its 
neighbors. One of China’s leading international relations scholars, Yan Xuetong 
(2012) notes that “for China it is not a question of what type of leadership we 
might want to provide. (…) What they [leadership] discuss is whether we should 
take on a leadership role in the first place.” His idea of a Chinese leadership based 
on “humane authority” may well be compatible with an Indo‑Chinese concert to 
revive the Panchsheel principles. 
But could such an Asian Helsinki be reached without the participation and lead‑
ership of the United States? It must. Participation of the United States would 
fundamentally alter the balance of power and further increase the disincentives 
for China, already wary about America’s profile in the region. In this sense, 
Washington’s role in an Asian “G2” would have to be limited to mere sponsor‑
ship from the sidelines – allowing Asian states to work out their own, specific 
modalities of Asian security. This may sound utopian at this stage, but is a po‑
ssibility that may become more probable as the United States declines in relative 
power and adapts to its lesser role in Asia. It is also a posture the United States 
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may have to grow more comfortable with as it increasingly seeks to delegate its 
managerial duties to other states.
A fourth and final alternative on the Indian strategic menu is one that is current‑
ly quite popular in New Delhi. It focuses in the sacred quest for “strategic au‑ 
tonomy,” which has seemingly served India so well during the Cold War. This ex‑
tremely pragmatic stance focuses on introversion and what is traditionally called 
“internal” balancing – i.e. refusing “external” balancing (alliances) in favor of 
strengthening the domestic sources of economic, military and technological power. 
This refusal of power politics, often erroneously called the “Nehruvian legacy” in 
India’s strategic thought, assumes that India will be able to separate the technical, 
economic dimensions of power from the security realm. For example, it assumes 
that India will be able to access energy resources, transport them to India, and 
convert them into power (whether electric, scientific or military) without engaging 
into security competition with China and other states. This isolationist, introvert 
and exceptionalist India would certainly face a series of threats and challenges, as 
described by Ashley Tellis (2012: 55) in his critique of the Non-Alignment 2.0 report:
“…the notion that Indian exceptionalism can survive by sheer force of example 
in a world of beasts could turn out to be excessively optimistic if not simply 
naive. After all, India’s capacity to lead by example will be, in the final analysis, 
largely a function of its material success, and this accomplishment will not come 
to pass without strong economic, political, and military ties with key friendly 
powers, especially the United States.” 
One glaring example of how difficult this would be in practice is illustrated by the 
2012 case of India’s exploration of oil blocks in offshore Vietnam, which was im‑
mediately opposed by China and consequently securitized under the South China 
Sea dispute. The same applies to the sea lines of communication and enjoying the 
current freedom of navigation. New Delhi may have grown used to be a free‑rider 
in certain areas, or may not be aware of the hidden costs that go into managing the 
current liberal order as we know it, but that does not mean it will continue to be 
able to enjoy such benefits in the future. This explains the American focus on the 
concept of a “transactional” relationship with New Delhi. 
Which of these four options – or maybe a combination of two or more – India will 
eventually adopt remains uncertain. Once thing is certain, however: New Delhi is 
now irreversibly enmeshed into the greater security complex of the Asia‑Pacific, or 
Indo‑Pacific, and its future posture will have a dramatic, if not determinant impact 
on the future of the global order, as well as on the prospects of war and peace in 
Asia. 
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